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THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOSITY ON AMERICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THREE MAJOR RELIGIONS IN THE U.S.

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Abstract

Influences upon American values or social attitudes have long been an issue of sociological debate. Understanding the social forces that influence social attitudes is of grave importance, as they help determine or focus the course of action an individual, a community, state, or even a nation may take over a contentious social issue. The literature suggests that religiosity has an impact on social attitudes on a multidimensional basis (Read, 2003; Sheepers, et al., 2002; Lee and Early, 2000; Hadaway, et al., 1984). Thus, this study explored the dimensions of religiosity and its impact on social attitudes regarding homosexuality, abortion, family values, and immigration. The research took a multidimensional approach to the operationalization of religiosity. As identified by Glock (1959, 1962), the religiosity dimensions consisted of ***experiential, ritualistic, ideological, consequential, and intellectual.*** The General Social Survey's data fiom 1994, 1996, 2004, and fiom compiled years (1972-2004) were used to conduct multivariate and regression analysis. Analyses controlled for race/ethnicity and religious affiliation. The results indicated that, as predicted, religiosity does have an impact on social attitudes. Specifically, individuals who were religious at the strongest categories of the experiential, ritualistic, consequential, ideological, and intellectual dimension held conservative social attitudes on homosexuality and abortion. Interestingly, the five religiosity dimensions explained little of the variance in American attitudes about immigration and family values. Moreover, differences in social attitudes held across racial and ethnic lines and religious affiliation, regardless of intensity of religious beliefs.

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Prologue

I tend to believe that all life-experiences, whether personal, academic, or professional, are intertwined and evolve to new experiences, ideas, and even challenges. The idea of working on an Honors Thesis was an evolutionary process that arose out of the combination of a number of life experiences.

When I first came to know the Lord, my life changed dramatically. My perspective on life, values, and beliefs came to rotate three hundred and sixty degrees! I became amazed and intrigued at how one's personal religious choice can have such an impact on a person's life.

As an Honors Sociology Major, I've been introduced to major theoretical frameworks and research topics regarding social change, development, and inter-functioning of societies – among others. Of particular interest in my major, has been the introduction to religion as an institution and understanding the development of religiosity, and its impact on society – specifically on social attitudes. My interest in this research is to test theoretical frameworks that offer explanations about religiosity's impact on social attitudes by using empirical evidence. Although there are many social forces which impact American's social attitudes, I focus particularly on religiosity because of my personal religious experience but more importantly because recent research shows that most Americans find religion at least somewhat in their lives.

As a future lawyer, I have ambitions to enter the world of politics. It is my objective to explore religiosity's impact on respondents' social attitudes on some of today's most sensitive topics - homosexuality, abortion, family values, and immigration – because doing so will make me be a better educated practitioner of the law and future politician!

Chapter 1: Introduction

Influences upon American social attitudes have long been an issue of sociological debate. The literature suggests that religiosity, among other prominent social factors such as socioeconomic status, has an impact on social attitudes on a multidimensional basis (Read, 2003; Sheepers, et al., 2002; Lee and Early, 2000; Hadaway, et al., 1984). Understanding the impact of religiosity on social attitudes is of grave importance as social attitudes help *determine* or focus the course of action an individual, a community, region, state, or even a nation may take over a controversial social issue. For example, whether an individual is religious or not may impact his or her conservative, moderate, or liberal views over controversial topics on homosexuality, abortion, family values, and immigration – all contentious social issues in America today. Exploring the impact of religiosity on each of these areas is crucial as the United States moves forward to reform or amend American policy.

This Honors Thesis proposes to take a multidimensional approach to the operationalization of religiosity and explore the different dimensions of religiosity an individual may profess; how the three major religions practiced in the U.S. are different or alike; whether differences (if any) among the three major religions result in significant differences in the social attitudes of adherents regarding homosexuality, abortion, family values, and immigration; and whether differences in the impact of religiosity on each of these areas exist across racial and ethnic lines, years of education, family income, sex, and region of the country, with a focus on the West South Central region, which includes Texas.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Development

Religion and the development of religiosity can be theoretically understood in numerous ways. Functionalist theories for instance, share the assumption that as "societies develop they become ever more complex and interdependent" (Delaney, 2004). That is, each social institution is necessary for the survival of another; therefore, religion or religiosity performs an integral *function* in the larger society.

As the literature suggests, religiosity has an impact on the development of social attitudes. This study hypothesizes that religiosity is an integral criterion in the development of what respondents believe regarding homosexuality, abortion, family values, and immigration – social issues important to today's political agenda. Of course, religiosity is not the sole determinant of social attitudes as there are a number of intervening variables including religious affiliation, years of education, family income, age, sex, and the region of the country individuals reside that relatively influence or play an integral function in the development of respondents' social attitudes. Thus religiosity coexists with other social institutions or variables. Nevertheless, functionalism operates at a macro-level and ignores diversity among religious institutions (e.g. among Protestant or Jewish denominations). Understanding diversity is integral as all individuals (regardless of religious affiliation) operate at different levels of beliefs

Symbolic interactionists argue that the prominent force that drives individuals to create and adhere to religion is specifically a process of social interaction through the use of symbols described as a socialization process (Delaney, 2004:148). Religiosity is defined as the intensity of a person's practice of his or her religion. However, to first practice a religion (thus prior to the development of religiosity) individuals must undergo

a religious socialization process to learn the "mechanics" of how the religious institution functions in the larger society. Therefore, religiosity is dependent on ones understanding and acceptance of those symbols and processes. In this stud, I analyzed whether differences in religious affiliation has an intervening impact on religiosity and sequentially on American social attitudes regarding homosexuality, abortion, family values, and immigration. In addition, functionalists argue that religiosity develops through the continual contact with religious values and beliefs such as the practice of rituals, reading of sacred texts, to even attending a religious service – among others. This study attempts to add to the literature with the development of different conceptual dimensions of religiosity. The dimension(s) that individuals adopt to display his or her religiosity are individual and deserve specific conceptualization. In fact, research has found that "general measures of religiousness have shown greater predictive power when distinctions are made by separating the variables into more specific categories" (Early, 2000). As detailed in latter sections of this Honors Thesis, Glockys (1959, 1962) complex multidimensional framework for religiosity will be adopted to operationalize religiosity along various *ritualistic* dimensions.

Conflict theory arises out of the necessity to explain diversity, competition, and antagonism within and between religious institutions, religiosity differences among adherents, and differing social attitudes across religious affiliations and dimensions of religiosity (Johnstone, 2004). For example, both Catholicism and Protestantism (in that order) arise out of Judaism. Religious conflict theorists would argue that conflict in Judaism gave birth to Catholicism. Conflict in Catholicism then gave birth to Protestantism through the Reformation Movement. Differing values and beliefs among

adherents of each of these religious institutions is at the center of this revolutionary conflict that leads individuals to adhere to a new or modified set of religious values and beliefs – or a new religious movement. Thus, differences across religious institutions are partially the cause for differences in the development of different dimensions of religiosity – as religiosity is dependent on religious affiliation. In addition, the literature suggests that Protestants, Catholics, and Jews face conceptualization issues as adherents of each religious institution operate at different dimensions of religious intensity – idea that conflict theorist explain as conflict within the larger religious institution. This study is interested in exploring whether there are differences in religiosity across and within religious institutions and any impacts on American social attitudes.

Chapter 3: Major Religions in the United States

The extant number of religions in practice in the United States today is a symbol of the religious liberalism available through our constitutional rights. The First Amendment to the constitution proclaimed the official stance of American society on religion by affirming that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof' (Nash, et al., 2004). Nevertheless, it is not surprising to find the United States among the few nations of the world providing a shelter to non-mainstream religious cults, sects, or in modern sociological terms, New ***Religious Movements*** (NRM). While many nations face constant religious conflict (e.g. warfare between Muslims and Jews; or Protestants and Catholics) the United States, while religiously diversified still maintains and promotes social order. Beyer (2003) argues that "while most countries in the world today officially declare that their citizens enjoy freedom of religion, none of them actually allows the unfettered exercise of that freedom". While Beyer's (2003) argument would clearly depict early American history where respondents scrutinized those with religious beliefs divergent to Protestantism, recent General Social Surveys data (2004) suggests that the U.S. is religiously diversified with 54% Protestant, 33% Catholic, 2.2% Jewish, 0.6% Buddhist, 0.5% Hindu, and 0.8% Islamic. Although percentages may appear small particularly for minority groups (e.g. Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam), an American population of over 281 million suggests that these minority groups are numerically well represented (although some groups are geographically concentrated) in the religiously and culturally diverse U.S. society. As suggested by General Social Survey data of 2004, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism still remain the major religious institutions in America. This segment of my

thesis attempts to identify social characteristics of the three major religions as well as past research on the development of religiosity among adherents of these major religions..

Judaism

I begin my discussion on U.S. major religions with a literature-review of Judaism as is in fact, "the source out of which Christianity grew, first as Catholicism (later divided into the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox branches), and then through the Reformation Movement as Protestantism" (Johnstone, 2004:321). In the United States, as suggested by 2000 Census data, Jews (whether identifiable by ethnicity or religion) constitute 2.2 percent of the total American population. Moreover, like American Protestantism (to be discussed), American Judaism is stratified into a number of categories which is inclusive of Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist, Hasidic, and cultural-ethnic Jews (Johnstone, 2004). However, I will focus on Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Judaism as they are the "best organized and widespread of the Jewish branches" (Greenberg, 1984). How are these Jewish branches distinguishable from one another relative to ritual practices, doctrine, and values and or beliefs? And, will difference (if any) between groups' goals and values significantly impact their social or secular attitudes? Further, how different (if at all) are American Jews from American Catholics and Protestants with respect to social attitudes?

Of the six Jewish branches, Orthodoxy firmly follows the teachings of the Torah (or the first five books of the Old Testament, also known as the Pentateuch) and the moral teachings of the *Halakhah* or Jewish law (Johnstone, 2004; Greenberg, 1984). In American society, Orthodox Jews have had little or no assimilation to American values or beliefs as affirmed by their constant observation of both traditional doctrine and rituals.

Because they withhold assimilation to American culture, Orthodox Jews believe they are the "legitimate bearers of Jewish tradition" (Johnstone, 2004.322). In particular, Orthodox Judaists practice important religious holidays such as Yom Kippur and Passover, and make observation of the Sabbath from "sunset Friday to sunset Saturday" in which they "put aside the secular world and enter a world of prayer, family activities that will not allow cooking, writing, buying and selling, and any number of other everyday activities that are avoided on such a special day in the week" (Johnstone, 2004:322). However, the "rebellious attitudes of the mid-1960's undermined the stability of the Jewish community" in the United States (Johnstone, 2004). Traditional Judaism, that is, Orthodoxy, began to lose membership as their stance on traditional social behaviors and attitudes were "outmoded rituals, practices, and beliefs" (Greenberg, 1984).

While Orthodoxy is the strictest of the Jewish branches, Reform Judaism is at the other end of fundamentalism with their liberal approach to social behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs (Johnstone, 2004). According to Johnstone (2004), "Reform Judaism emerged in nineteenth-century Europe as a very conscious attempt by some Jewish intellectuals led by Abraham Geiger (1810-1874) in Germany to bring traditional Jewish Orthodox more up to date and in tune with modern realities". In effect, that aim to modernize Judaism has taken place over time and has further led to the belief that the Torah is "a record of divine inspiration rather than the literal word of God and substituted Jewish law with ethics (Johnstone, 2004; Greenberg, 1984). According to Johnstone (2004), the declaration of principles issued by the Frankfurt Society of the Friends of Reform in 1843 clearly summarizes their values and or beliefs of Reform Judaism:

> "First we recognize the possibility of unlimited development in the Mosaic religion. Second, the collection of controversies and prescriptions commonly designated by the name Talmud possess for us no authority from either doctrinal or the practical standpoint. Third, a Messiah who is to lead back the Israelites to the land of Palestine is neither expected nor desired by us; we know no fatherland but that to which we belong by birth or citizenship."

Contrary to Orthodoxy, Reform Jews make use of little Hebrew in religious services, approve of men and women seating together, celebrate Sunday as the Sabbath, and approve of marriage outside the family and the omitting of prayer for the restoration of the Jewish state (McLemore and Romo, 2005:94). Further, McLemore and Romo (2005) argue that "when combined, these factors stimulate a comparatively rapid cultural assimilation by substitution and a very rapid secondary structural assimilation of German Jews in the United States". Frankly, it is difficult for religious-ethnic groups to maintain their traditional views, values, and beliefs in an American society so diverse - particularly because much of their daily living would include socializing with individuals of other ethnic, cultural, and religious traditions.

The American and Jewish social compromise took place through the largest of the Jewish branches, Conservative Judaism, which traces its genuine origins to the United States. With a growing Judaist necessity and desire to assimilate to American values and or beliefs, and the fact that many Jews were no longer living in Jewish ghettos but in large and diverse American cities, acculturation took effect – a process by which a person or group drops his or her values and beliefs to adopt a new set of customs and traditions (Johnstone, 2004:323). Johnstone (2004) further argues that Conservative Judaism

objectively blends Orthodox and Reform Judaism by adopting English as their native and doctrinal language however maintaining historic customs, rituals, and beliefs.

The literature suggests that among the issues Jews are most currently concerned with include "the protracted Israeli-Arab conflict, relations between the State of Israel and Diaspora communities, Jewish-Christian dialogue, pluralism within Judaism, and gender equality" (Tirosh-Samuelson, 2005). Further, Ben-Ari (2004) argues that "the nature of the relations between groups determines the nature of their mutual attitudes" That is, "positive relations foster the development of positive attitudes and perceptions, whereas in a state of conflict, discrimination and prejudice are bound to emerge" (Ben-Ari, 2004). This is a particularly interesting idea, and certainly of interest for my thesis, relative to the social attitudes Jews may have towards homosexuality and family values. Will differences abound among American Jews and those with affiliation to the Catholic Church or of Protestant practices?

Roman Catholicism

Roman Catholicism has had an interesting history in the United States as have other minority groups who have entered the American domain. As previously mentioned, Roman Catholicism arises out of Judaism. As per American history, in the early establishment of this nation, there were rapid European immigration streams that sparked fear among many 'Americans' - especially because there was an ***American identity*** still developing. This ***American identity*** was yet to be defined as America was a new nation and the ideas and values of what constituted an American were unclear. In particular, the Irish during the first great immigration stream of the nineteenth century attracted unfavorable notice of native-born Americans for two reasons. First, the Irish were of

Roman Catholic background and two; they were strong political activists (McLemore and Romo, 2005:82). There was of course, an American fear that Catholics would gain religious majority, and given their political activism, gain control of the American government. "Even when millions of immigrants from eastern and southern Europe and Ireland swelled the ranks of the Catholic Church in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Roman Catholicism continued to be viewed with suspicion and distrust by other Americans" (Johnstone, 2004:324). This is an ideal example of Beyer's (2003) argument as previously mentioned, in which early Americans professed religious liberalism,,while discriminating against those whose views or beliefs were contrary to the developed *civil religion*

In addition, contrary to Protestant denominations, Roman Catholicism is structured under the Episcopalian form-of-government (Johnstone, 2004). That is, the authority proceeds through a hierarchy-from the heads of the denominations such as a pope, archbishop, or bishop, down to local representatives such as a priest (Johnstone, 2004:320). Interestingly, particularly among Hispanics in the United States, Catholicism has been losing adherents as there has been a transcending shift from Catholicism to Protestantism (Hunt, 2000). What social factors are theoretically pushing Hispanic Catholic adherents to Protestant affiliations? Hunt (2000) argues that changes in secular status as suggested by Weber's Protestant Ethic may be an influencing factor in the growing Protestant affiliation among Hispanics in the United States. That is, because Hispanics are gaining higher social and economic status, the Catholic Church is no longer providing their needs. It is interesting that among Protestant organizations, many are representative of 'stand-alone' status. That is, the large membership allows for a single

religious Protestant organization to socially survive without the reliance on a chain of organizations or national affiliation (e.g. Southern Baptist Convention, Assemblies of God, and Church of Christ). Further, stand-alone faith-based organizations particularly those composed of higher socioeconomic status hold characteristics such as shorter length of religious service, preaching/teachings promoting and supporting of economic advancement, and members making significant financial contributions - which allows for 'stand-alone' status (Johnstone, 2004). Are past Catholic adherents actually turning to the membership of stand-alone organizations that are accommodating of their newly achieved socioeconomic status? What impact has Catholicism had on the social attitudes of its adherents? Furthermore, do trends over a period of time suggest a decline in Catholic affiliation among American citizens? Interestingly, findings suggest that among Catholics, both men and women tend to hold liberal views, with Catholic women more likely to have less religious involvement when compared to Protestant women (Hunt, 2001).

In recent years, the Catholic Church has been under much religious scrutiny-particularly by the general public, Church adherents, followers, and ***Catholic believers.*** Catholic adherents' social attitudes seem to contradict the Catholic Church's official stance on social behaviors, particularly those concerning lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender issues (LGBT), as well as masturbation and gender roles. According to Hoffmann and Miller (1997), Catholics tend to report moderate attitudes, whereas Jews and nonaffiliated report the most liberal positions toward social attitudes and or behaviors. Hoffmann and Miller (1997) further argue that "although a reasonable hypothesis holds that these differences are due to variations in education, region, and

community size among religious groups, empirical tests indicate that these factors only partially explain group differences." If education, region, and group size are only a partial explanation for differences in social attitudes and levels of fundamentalism, will religiosity be of less, more, or equal influence on individuals who profess a Catholic affiliation?

Protestantism

Among American Protestant denominations, it is difficult to generalize doctrine, practices, values and/or beliefs because much diversity exists among each denominational group. For example, whereas some Baptist and Church of Christ groups may favor the lack of musical instruments for music worship, Pentecostals may allege that the use of instrumental music is equally worthy of worship to the Lord.

Interestingly, differences among Protestant denominations are further evidenced in differences in perception over the creation of the earth. "While some believe' God created the universe in six days of twenty-four hours each in length, others accept evolutionary theories that do not presume divine creation of any kind" (Johnstone, 2004). In a sample of various Protestant denominations, Glock and Stark (1968) found that 99% of Southern Baptist, 75% of Presbyterians, 63% of Episcopalians, 60% of Methodist, and 41% of Congregationalist believed that God really existed and held no doubts about it (Johnstone, 2004). Indeed, Protestantism faces similar definitional issues to those of religiosity, as both are a multi-dimensional phenomenon - as evidenced by the diverse definitions for both terms.

Recent ethnographic work on mainline Protestants further suggests that the centrality of Bible study has an impact on "congregational life, individual spirituality, and

religious communication" (Bielo, 2004). How is this impact (if any) representative of American social attitudes? Protestant denominations even differ on values and beliefs, particularly those related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender issues (LGBT). According to Harry and Sharron (2006), among the Protestant denominations that openly support LGBT equality are the United Church of Christ which ordains LGBT ministers; Metropolitan Community Churches founded in 1968 as the world's first church to have a primary, positive ministry to LGBT people; and the Unitarian Universalist Church which was among the first to an "open and affirming" denomination in the United States. The Southern Baptist Convention, on the other hand, although under much religious scrutiny, maintains conservative views about marriage, sexuality, and gender roles.

The structure of Protestant groups in the U.S. is also of much scholarly interest. According to Hunt (2001), Protestantism differs from Catholicism in that Protestant groups tend to be smaller, more participatory, and Congregational in structure than Episcopalian. With a smaller structure, Protestant groups are more welcoming and offer a more intimate sense of community or belonging. In fact, the revolution in Christianity which is known as the Reformation, was a not a revolt against certain beliefs, but a revolt against the form of governing church life; that is, a rejection of papal primacy (Sullins, 2004). Johnstone (2004:321-322) further argues that the term Protestant refers "to the idea of protest against what some viewed as perversions and distortions of original Christianity within the Roman Catholic Church". Sullins (2004) stated that among the primary reasons the classification of Protestant groups has failed is in part due to the lack of an easily accessible scale to the centralization of authority. Further, contrary to an Episcopalian form of government, decision-making in a congregation (a form which is

common among Protestant denominations) is left in the hands of the local group with the "national denomination having little authority, at least of a formal nature" (Johnstone, 2004:320). This leads to the following questions: do the peculiar structure of Protestant groups have an impact on the values and or beliefs of their followers versus membership in a larger religious community which may involve little socialization among members? And do these attitudes significantly differ from those of other religious affiliations - particularly Catholics and Jews? Recent findings suggest that Hispanic Protestants have higher levels of religious involvement than do Hispanic Catholics (Hunt, 2000). Hunt (2000) further suggests that between mainstream Hispanic Protestants and Hispanic Catholics, mainline Hispanic Protestants have higher socioeconomic status. In a later study, Hunt's (2001) findings suggest that both male and female Protestants have highly conservative gender-role attitudes, Protestant women are more likely to have heightened religious involvement, and Protestant men are more likely to have distinctive secular status patterns, all when compared to Catholics.

Conclusion

As suggested by the literature, all three major religions encompass within group diversity of opinions and / or attitudes regarding homosexuality, abortion, family values, and immigration. Overall however, Protestants are more likely to register conservative social views when compared to Catholics and Jews. Of all three religious institutions, Catholic adherents are more likely to register opposition to their religious institution's strong opposition towards homosexuality and abortion. Nevertheless, Protestant groups have the longest U.S. history.

This study will explore differences in the impact of religiosity on American social attitudes across the three religious institutions. To accommodate differences among denominational groups in each religious institution, I plan to use a variable that controls for levels of fundamentalisms.

Chapter 4: Religiosity: A Multi-dimensional Phenomenon

Religiosity is defined as the intensity and consistency of a person's practice of his or her religion (Johnstone, 2004). The operationalization of religiosity, however, is complex as research suggests religiosity is a multi-dimensional phenomenon (Johnstone, 2004:67; Lee and Early, 2000). Not all individuals are religious in the same manner. While one person may value prayer or chanting sessions each evening during the week, another may value the study of the Torah, Bible, or Koran. And, although at different ends of the religious spectrum, both individuals may allege high levels of religiosity. This idea then, problematizes researchers' operationalization of religiosity. That is, because individuals are religious at different dimensions, there is a crucial need to be inclusive in the conceptualization of religiosity. It is important to be inclusive of the many forms an individual may be religious. For instance, an ideal conceptualization of religiosity might include whether or not s/he attends church, prays, participates in religious organizations' activities and or rituals, and or has knowledge of religious scriptures.

Religiosity

In attempts to stratify the different dimensions of religiosity, Glock (1959) identified four distinct dimensions at which a person may exhibit his or her level of religiosity and later in 1962, coined a fifth (as cited in Johnstone, 2004) (see Table 1). This Honors Thesis will adopt Glock's religiosity framework in an effort to measure the precise intensity of person's practice of his or her religion and operationalize variables that measure each religiosity dimension outline below.

Dimensions of Religiosity

Experiential

An individual exhibiting a degree of emotional attachment to the supernatural is classified under the experiential dimension of Glock's study (Johnstone, 2004:68). Experiential religiosity is neither mental nor physical, neither instrumental nor theoretical; it essentially seeks the evident and the manifest of that which is believed such as a religious or mystical experience (Yamane and Polzer, 1994:2).

Research on religious experience can be dated back to nineteenth-century psychologist and philosopher William James with his individualist approach to religion. According to James, religion is "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine" (as cited in Monahan, et al., 2004:55). Essentially, James argued that in order to have a clear understanding of the human condition, the effects of religious experience needed to be assessed scientifically by researchers (as cited in Monahan, et al., 2001:55). That idea is of much interest for this research as it is the primary objective behind this analysis - to statistically analyze the effect of religiosity on social attitudes.

In the late 1960s, Berger argued that religious or mystical experiences aid in opening our perception about reality and overcome feelings of worthlessness and meaninglessness. In contrast, Bahr and Martin's (1983) found little correlation between religiosity and self-esteem.

Research suggests that 'mystical experiences' may even be stratified by socioeconomic status. Yamane and Polzer (1994:15) for example, found that Blacks

living in the South or West regions of the U.S. and "those individuals with occupations scoring low on the prestige scale have a high probability of having had an ecstatic experience, without controlling for their religious affiliation, behavior, or views". This suggests that perhaps those of high socioeconomic status may or may not seek mystical experiences but if they do experience them, they differ from those of lower socioeconomic status. Further, these findings may suggest that individuals of higher socioeconomic status may encounter a mystical experience through means such as shopping, reading books, or engaging in fitness and spiritual programs such as Pilates or Yoga; whereas an individual of lower socioeconomic status may obtain a religious experience through long hours of church attendance, constant prayer, and practice of religious rituals (e.g. Communion, Passover, or a *Rosario*). Yet, when controlling for religious denomination, Yamane and Polzer (1994:16) found that all of the Protestant categories have positive relationships with the likelihood of religious experience. Moreover, research suggests that when no religious preference is stated by an individual, the likelihood he or she experiences religious ecstasy declines (Yamane and Polzer, 1994:16).

Ritualistic

The ritualistic dimension of religiosity, according to Glock (1959), counts the rate of participation in a religious group's activities. According to Johnstone (2004), in 1968 Glock and Stark stratified ritualistic dimension into two areas: ritual and devotion. While the ritual element particularly emphasizes formal religious activities, the devotion facet stresses an informal and individualistic approach to the practice of rituals (Johnstone, 2004:68). Ritual activities may include the practice of Communion for many Christian

denominations, the practice of Confession for Roman Catholics, practice of Passover for Jews, to even the handling of snakes as practiced by a Pentecostal denomination in southern Appalachia (Monahan, et al., 2001:27). However, the literature suggests that a prominent measure of ritual is church attendance (Curry, et al., 2004; Scheepers, et al., 2002; Yamane and Polzer, 1994; Montoro, 1993; Hadaway, et al., 1984). While it may be helpful in determining differences across religious group participation, solely considering church attendance as a measure of religiosity may be misleading and biased. For instance, if taking church attendance as a crucial determinant of religiosity, an individual who is knowledgeable over the teachings of the Bible yet rejects the idea of attending religious services, may result in a low religiosity score even though that individual believes s/he is very religious based on his/her Biblical knowledge. It is important to differentiate between individuals who may also study the Bible for academic purposes only and hold no religious preference. ***Devotion*** on the other hand, includes religious practices such as prayer and the study of sacred books and religious writings (Johnstone, 2004:68).

Ideological

Another religiosity dimension coined by Glock (1959) is the ideological notion of religiosity that "refers to the degree of commitment to the religious beliefs of a person's group" (Johnstone, 2004:68). In other words, this level attempts to indicate whether an individual is likely to practice what the group preaches, teaches, values, or believes. While a person may avow affiliation to any given religious organization, is the believer following through with the religious groups' moral and divine expectations? For example, the Vatican in 1975 with the publication of the "Declaration on Certain

Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics" affirmed their position against homosexuality, extramarital sex, and 'masturbation (Monahan, et al.,. 2001:184). However, when surveyed, 67.5 percent of Catholics strongly agreed with the idea that the Catholic Church should recognize same sex-partnerships (Yip, 1997:170). Essentially, if only measuring religiosity using the ideological level, the 67.5 percent of Catholics who support homosexuality (although the Catholic Church holds strong opposition) would measure low on the religiosity scale as they failed to commit to the religious group's beliefs.

Table 1: Glock's Five Dimensions of Religiosity

Dimension:	~ h ait conceptualizes:
Experiential	Degree of emotional attachment to the supernatural e.g. mystical experience
Ritualistic	Rate of participation in a religious group's activities. Divided into two categories: *ritual* and *devotion. Ritual* emphasizes formal religious activities and devotion stresses an informal and individualistic approach to the practice of rituals.
Ideolog cal	Degree of commitment to the religious beliefs of a person's group.
Consequential	Refers to the impact of religious commitment and involvement on an individual's general behavior.
Intellectual	Degree of knowledge about the formal beliefs of a person's religion.

Source: Johnstone (2004)

Consequential & Intellectual

The last two dimensions used in operationalizing religious intensity are the notions of consequential and intellectual religiosity. While consequential religiosity refers to "the impact of religious commitment and involvement on an individual's general

behavior", the intellectual notion emphasizes "the degree of knowledge about the formal beliefs of a person's religion" (Johnstone, 2004). The consequential dimension of religiosity is of much interest for this research as this aspect of religiosity has an impact on an individual's behavior, which may include his or her values, beliefs, and social attitudes.

The consequential dimension attempts to configure the consequence of religion on individual behavior. Many would argue that religion, as a social institution, brings forth positive character, attitudes, and behavior on individuals. However, is deviance among religious ,groups existent in America today? In research examining the relationship between religious involvement in terms of affiliation and attendance and abortion attitudes among three major Hispanic groups, Ellison, et al. (2005) found that committed Hispanic Protestants are more strongly pro-life and more likely to support the total ban of abortion. Committed Catholics are also strong supporters of pro-life, however, more likely to "endorse an abortion ban that includes exceptions for rape, incest, and threats to the mother's life" (Ellison, et al., 2005).

Conclusion

In conclusion, Glock's (1959, 1962) identification of the five dimensions of religiosity will aid the development of a multidimensional approach to analyzing the impact of religiosity on social attitudes in latter sections of my Honors Thesis. The five levels will play a critical juncture in the operationalization of religiosity as I plan to use variables which operationalize each dimension: ***experiential, ritualistic, ideological, consequential, and intellectual*** as part of my analyses.

Chapter 5: Social Attitudes

The existing literature suggests that social or secular attitudes are indeed influenced by the dimensions of religiosity individuals claim (Ellison, et al., 2005; Curry, et al., 2004; Read, 2003; Scheepers, et al., 2002; Lee and Early, 2000; Hoffmann and Miller, 1997; Cochran, et al., 1996; Cochran and Beeghley, 1991). An attitude,' by definition, refers to a state of mind or feeling toward a particular social phenomenon. Further, an attitude may define either a positive, negative, or even neutral state of mind. While a positive attitude may suggest the approval, support, or promotion of a social issue, antagonistic or negative social attitudes will register opposition. This section of my thesis attempts to identify the most prominent social attitudes about which the American population expresses opinions. In this study, I will be focusing on the social attitudes regarding immigration, family values, abortion, and homosexuality – as the literature suggests they are among the most controversial social issues in the United States today.

Immigration Reform: The Case of Illegal Immigrants

I begin my discussion of controversial social issues with immigration reform and the social attitudes that the American population expresses - particularly those of recent years. Of particular interest are the current immigration reform movements. For example, On May 1st of 2006, hundreds of thousands of individuals across the United States rallied and specifically called it "A *Day without Immigrants!"* These particular protestors claimed that illegal immigrants deserve the opportunity to legalize and adjust their residency status. They even argued that the mass deportation, felony conviction of undocumented immigrants, and construction of a 700-mile wall along the U.S.-Mexico

border is unjust, cruel, and un-American. Thus these protestors expressed a social attitude supporting favorable immigration reform for undocumented individuals in America.

There is also a segment of the American population that favors immigration reform which curtails immigration flow. For example, as an Intern in the Office of the United States Representative Henry Cuellar, I frequently reported concerns of constituents who believe a strict immigration reform that encompasses mass deportation, felony conviction of undocumented immigrants, and construction of a 700-mile wall along the U.S. – Mexico border would help to reinforce this country's homeland security as any other country would (including Mexico)[1].

In a recent study which explored the entrepreneurial tendencies of Mexican immigrants in metropolitan statistical areas, Mora and Davila (2006) argue that "immigration reform which curtails the immigration flow from Mexico might hinder small business formation and economic development on the U.S. side of Mexican border." That is, if the U.S. Congress were to impose a strict migratory regulation, the economic development of segments of our nation would be negatively influenced as immigrant's economic contribution is crucial. In addition, Card (2005) argued that "evidence that immigrants harm native opportunities is slight, while the fear that post-1965 immigrants will never assimilate is belied by the rather surprising educational success of their children". In fact, both of these particular arguments are among those

[1] All calls that I personally monitored within the last few weeks as an Intern, suggested that a large percentage of individuals within the Texas 28" Congressional District disapproved of the protests. Most constituents who called argued that 'these' undocumented immigrants plead for U.S. residency status, yet their demonstrations and use of a foreign country flag suggest they wish to remain separate. However, it is fair to note that perhaps only those that opposed the demonstrations were more inclined to call the Congressman's office and those in support are less likely to do so. Congressman Henry Cuellar is considered a conservative U.S. Representative.

employed by participants of the immigration reform movement who support favorable immigration reform for undocumented-individuals in America. In attempts to promote the economic contributions of immigrants, a Hispanic boycott took place across the United States (also on May 1st of 2006). In this one-day boycott, Hispanics were advised not to purchase American products. In this study, I am interested in whether religiosity has an impact on American attitude toward immigration and whether differences will hold across adherents of the three major religions in America.

Family Values

Another controversial topic related to the attitudes of Americans is that of family values. Specifically, family values encompass the idea or notion of what defines the general composition of family and the roles of its members. That is, does a family constitute a married male and female with birth of children delivered after marriage? Or, is an ideal family one which involves partners of the same sex and adopted children? Further, is a "real" family one in which the mother stays at home to perform house duties and raise the children, while the male is the head of the household and provides for the family's needs?

In a recent study on religiosity and family values as correlates of the variable God-image in a Protestant sample, Lee and Early (2000) found that religion and family values share a moderate but significant association. That is, the image adherents have of God (which is used as a measure of religiosity in the study) had a significant impact on the view individuals have of family values. Further, that impact led to a more traditional view on family – one which values a household composition of a male-female couple and children. However, in another study on the impact of religion on moral attitudes,

Sheepers, et al., (2002) found that "people hold quite different views on moral issues depending on the denomination to which their parents (particularly their mother) belonged". That is, family values were dependent on the self-reported denomination of the respondent. For example, as a Protestant Pentecostal affiliate, I value the particular family model in which I was raised. However, as evidenced by recent support for homosexuality, an Episcopalian counterpart may more likely support the union between same-sex partners and the formation of families of that type. The difference thus is not the broader religious institution (in this case Protestant) but in the specific denomination within the larger religious umbrella to which we each belong. Moreover, some research findings suggest that individuals of religious affiliations other than Catholic are less likely to hold conservative views (Sheepers, et al., 2002).

Among the purposes of this thesis is to empirically analyze the effect or impact that religiosity (if any) will have on attitudes about same sex marriage as an indicator of traditional family values. Further, I explore whether attitudes toward family values reflect a progressive or traditional view and whether religious affiliation has an impact on the specific orientation.

Abortion

Abortion is a contentious social concern in American society. In fact, abortion is even a sensitive topic in U.S. foreign aid policy as evidenced by President Bush's re-imposition of the Global Gag Rule on the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) population program which restricts

> "foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that receive USAID family planning funds from using their own, non - U.S. funds to provide legal abortion

services, lobby their own governments for abortion law reform, or even provide accurate medical counseling or referrals regarding abortion (Center, 2003)."

Abortion, by definition, refers to the termination of a pregnancy and thus "expulsion of an embryo or of a fetus that is incapable of survival" (Abortion, 2004). Supporters of abortion by election are often referred to as pro-choice whereas those who completely oppose abortion are often labeled pro-life.

Research by Petersen (2001) found that "among people that attend church frequently, education's liberalizing effect on attitudes toward elective abortion is weakest among conservative Protestants and Catholics, intermediate among moderate Protestants, and strongest among liberal Protestants and Jews." Essentially, Peterson (2001) argued that education has a significant influence on views over abortion when adherents of Protestant or Catholic affiliation seldom attend church and less influential when they frequently do. In addition, the literature broadly suggests that the more education an individual has, the more liberal his or her attitudes will be. In this study, I will include a variable for years of education to empirically analyze the impact of education on social attitudes across levels of fundamentalism among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.

In analyzing abortion attitudes over time (1972-2002), Hoffman (2005) found that opposition to elective abortion among Evangelicals had in fact increased. It is believed however, that among the significant social factors responsible for this increased rather than decreased opposition (regardless of modernization of ideals, values, and beliefs) are cultural traditions, which have faced little influence by America's social evolution. Across racial/ethnic lines in the U.S., Elisson, et al. (2005) argues that "committed Hispanic Protestants, that is, those who regularly attend church services, are more likely

than any other Hispanic group to be pro-life and profess support for a total ban on abortion. Interestingly, committed Hispanic Catholics are more likely than Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Mexican-Americans to support a total ban of abortion that provides "exceptions for cases of rape, incest, or threats to the mother's life" (Elisson, et al., 2005). Bolks, et al. (2000) argued however that "attitudes toward abortion among the Latino populations are influenced by the same sets of variables that 'influence the attitudes of non-Latinos". Comparing the social attitudes of adherents of the three major religions and across racial/ethnic lines (as research has found) is important as it will help explain implications of my research findings in latter sections of this Honors Thesis.

My research questions include, what do data suggest is the general attitude of the American population toward the act of abortion? Are the opinions of respondents influenced by religiosity and does religious affiliation and the other control variables impact these attitudes?

Homosexuality

In the summer of 2006, I was awarded a Minority Serving Institutions Undergraduate Internship with the University of Michigan's Population Fellows Programs. After a process of agency selection, I was placed in the headquarters of Family Care International in Manhattan. I immediately recognized that much of my success as an intern at FCI would be my social assimilation or integration to a society which seemed to express more liberal attitudes towards homosexuality when compared to San Antonio – a much more conservative city. Indeed, I had a fabulous and enriching experience in an area outside my personal and social comfort zone. However, through my mind ran numerous questions regarding the social attitude differences between New

York City and San Antonio. In NYC, did people seldom attend church and thus over time, develop more liberal views towards homosexuality? Or were differences simply due to differences in demographic factors such as population size, literacy, race/ethnicity, age, and sex? Which social factors influence attitudes towards homosexuality? Are dimensions of religiosity and religious affiliation more important explanations?

Loftus (2001) developed two interesting hypotheses that would potentially help explain changing attitudes toward homosexuality using General Social Survey data (1973-1998):

1 "Can changes in attitudes be accounted for by the changing demographics of a population?"

2. "Are changing attitudes toward homosexuality embedded within larger cultural ideological shifts?"

Interestingly, her findings suggest that after the 1990s, American attitudes towards the morality of homosexuality became increasingly liberal (Loftus, 2001). According to Loftus' (2001) findings, demographic factors as well as shifts in cultural ideology account for "one-half of the change over time in attitudes toward homosexuality." For example, increasing education levels (demographic indicator) among segments of the American population may produce more liberal views towards homosexuality (see also Herek and Capitanio, 1995).

In this study, I will focus on attitudes about homosexuality, independent of religiosity and controlling for religious affiliation, race/ethnicity, education, sex, age, family income, region of the United States, and whether the area is considered urban or rural.

Chapter 6: Methods

In accordance to research by Charles Y. Glock (1959, 1962), with an effort to assess the precise intensity and consistency of a person's practice of his/her religion (i.e. religiosity), I selected variables that identify each religiosity dimension including the experiential, ritualistic, ideological, consequential, and intellectual notions. This study will add to the literature that suggests that the conceptualization of religiosity is complex. Rather than claim that an individual is more religious than another based on a hierarchical measure, this study (based on research by Glock (1959, 1962)) has constructed a complex, multidimensional scale which suggests that people express their religiosity ***differently***. For example, an individual whose score is high in one dimension of religiosity and not in any other dimension, would simply suggests he or she is ***religiously different*** and ***not any less religious*** from other individuals. My interest is in empirically analyzing whether an individual who is religious in a particular dimension of religiosity differs in attitudes when compared to an individual who is religious in a different dimension.

I focused on differences in the impact of religiosity on social attitudes across the three major religions in the U.S.: Judaism, Catholicism, and Protestantism. There was a specific focus on American social attitudes during the years of 2004, 1996, and 1994, because no other recent data are available. I also identified variables measuring each of the social attitude dimensions of interest, regarding immigration, family values, abortion, and homosexuality. Analyses were controlled for the following demographic variables: sex, age, race/ethnicity, years of education, income level, religious affiliation, and region of the U.S. respondents reside in and whether respondents live in an urban/rural area.

General Social Survey's data from 1994, 1996, and 2004 as well as a compiled data set (1972-2004) were used in statistical analysis using MicroCase. Analyses included appropriate univariate, bivariate (crosstabulations, correlations, analysis of variance), and multivariate (OLS regression) models, depending on the level of measurement of the variables included. All nominal variables were transformed into dummy variables for the OLS regressions. Specifics of variable conceptualization are detailed in the following sections.

General Social Survey Data Set

As, mentioned, I used the General Social Survey data set for 2004 and that of compiled years (1972-2004). The General Social Survey is "an almost annual "omnibus," personal interview survey of U.S. households conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), a non-profit facility and University of Chicago affiliate, with James A. Davis, Tom W. Smith, and Peter V. Marsden as principal investigators (PIs). The first survey took place in 1972 and since then more than 38,000 respondents have answered over 3,260 different questions. The special features of the GSS follow from its unique origin as the first, perhaps only, social science data set designed to be analyzed by "users," rather than the PIs and project staff"

Independent Variable: Religiosity

To measure the ***intellectual*** dimension of religiosity, which measures the degree of religious knowledge about the formal beliefs of a person's religion, I used the variable BIBLE, which asks for respondents to identify the Bible as the Word of God, Inspired Word of God, book of faith, or some other type of book. I created a dummy variable, coding individuals who believe the Bible to be the Word of God as my category of

interest or '1', and all other respondents were coded as the reference category or '0'. This dummy variable was included in the OLS regression models.

For the ***ritualistic*** dimension of religiosity counts the rate of participation in a religious group's activities. This specific dimension of religiosity is divided into two separate categories: ***ritual and devotion.*** To measure ***ritual*** category, I used the variable ATTEND, which asks the respondent how often they attend religious services, to measure the ***ritual*** category. To identify the ***devotion*** category of the ritualistic dimension, I used the variable PRAY, which asks the respondent how often they engage in religious prayer. Dummy variables were created for each of these variables, ATTEND and PRAY, and were thus included in OLS regression models. Specifically, I created two dummy variables for ATTEND, with categories of interest consisting of those individuals that never go to Church and those that go more than once a week to Church. Each of these sub-categories was coded as '1' and all other categories were labeled '0' as reference categories for the OLS regression. In addition, two dummy variables were constructed out of the variable PRAY, with categories of interest consisting of individuals that never pray and those that pray several times a day. Both of these sub-categories were labeled as '1', in each dummy variable respectively, and all other categories were considered as reference categories and were coded as '0'.

The ***ideological*** dimension of religiosity emphasizes the degree of commitment to a religious group's beliefs. To measure this particular notion, I used the variable GODCHNGE, which asks respondents to describe their beliefs of God. That is whether respondent(s) believe in the existence of a supreme deity. While individuals may profess affiliation to Protestantism, Judaism, or Catholicism, do they really believe there is a

God? Two dummy variables were created out of the variable GODCHNGE, with categories of interest consisting of individuals who "believe in God now and always have" and individuals who "don't believe in God and never have". Both of these subcategories were coded as '1' in each dummy variable respectively and all other categories were labeled as reference categories thus coded as '0'. Both dummy variables were included in the OLS regression models. Because of variable limitations for immigration analysis, I replaced the variable GODCHNGE (which is not available for the year 1994) for the variable NATURGOD, which asks for respondent's to categorize their beliefs regarding the relationship between God and nature. This variable was only used to conduct immigration analysis for the year 1994. Additionally, two dummy variables were constructed out of NATURGOD, with categories of interest, coded as '1', consisting of respondents who believe nature was created by God and those who believe that nature is sacred in itself. All other categories were coded as '0' and labeled as reference categories. These two dummy variables were included in OLS regression models for attitudes regarding immigration. Because of the same variable limitations for the year 1996, I replaced the GODCHNGE variable (which was not available for the year 1996) and replaced it with the variable POSTLIFE –which measures respondent's beliefs in life after death. One dummy variable was constructed out of POSTLIFE, with category of interest being respondents who don't believe in life after death. This specific category was coded as '1' and all others were coded '0' and labeled as reference categories. This POSTLIFE dummy variable was included in OLS regression models for attitudes about family values.

For the consequential dimension of religiosity, which measures the impact religious commitment to an organization has on a person's general or social behavior, I used the variable RELITEN, which asks respondent's strength of affiliation to a religious institution. A dummy variable was created out of the variable RELITEN, coding individuals who have a strong affiliation as the category of interest or '1' while all other categories were coded as '0' or reference categories. This particular variable was also included in the OLS regression models.

To measure the ***experiential*** dimension of religiosity (e.g., supernatural encounter of some kind), I used the variable REBORN which asks whether respondent has had a 'born-again' experience. I created a dummy variable from this particular variable, coding individuals who have had a 'born-again' experience as '1' and those individuals who have not had this mystical experience as '0'. This dummy variable was included in the OLS regression models. Because of variable limitations, I had to replace the variable REBORN with the variable GOD in order to conduct analysis for the immigration index (1996). The variable GOD measures a respondent's confidence in the existence of God. Two dummy variables were created out this particular variable, with variables of categories of interest consisting of respondents don't believe God exists and those who know God exist – all other categories were coded '0' as reference categories. Because of variable constraints for the year 1996, no analysis was conducted between experiential religiosity and attitudes about family values.

Dependent Variables: Social Attitudes

Immigration Index

As per attitudes on immigration reform, I used an index combining three items measuring attitudes about whether or not immigrants have a negative impact on American society. Respondents were given four response choices ranging fiom "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree" for the following three items: (1) immigrants are demanding too many rights (IMMPUSH2); (2) immigrants lead to economic growth (IMMECON2); (3) immigrants affect national unity (IMMUNITE2). Because this variable selection is only available for the year 1994, this index and results reflect the attitudes during the year of 1994. Possible values range from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating more negative attitudes toward immigration. The mean score on this index was 1.881 (SD = 0.739). A Cronbach's alpha of 0.75 indicates acceptable reliability for this measure (see Table 2, Appendix A).

Family *Values Index*

To measure American attitudes about family values, I constructed a family values index, consisting of four items, measuring beliefs about whether or not people benefit fiom a traditional family composition. The respondents were provided four answer choices ranging from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree" for the following four items: (1) children benefit fiom a traditional family (CHLDBEN2); (2) everyone benefits from a traditional family (ALLBEN2); (3) no one is hurt by a traditional family (NOONEHRT2); (4) women benefit from a traditional family (WOMENBEN2). Because this variable selection is only available for the year 1996, this index and results only reflect American attitudes during the year of 1996. Possible values range from 0 to

4, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes toward family values. The mean score on this index was 2.127 (SD = *1.311*). A Cronbach's alpha of 0.90 indicates acceptable reliability for this measure (see Table 3, Appendix A).

Homosexuality

To measure American attitudes about homosexual behavior, I used the variable HOMOSEX, which asks respondent how strongly they agree or disagree with whether homosexual sex relations among consenting adults is right or wrong. This particular variable formed part of multivariate analyses and the **OLS** regression model.

Abortion

To measure attitudes about abortion, I used an abortion index **(ABORTION)** which combines 7 items with possible values ranging from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating less pro-choice attitudes. Respondents were asked to asses whether a woman should be able to have an abortion (Yes or No) if (1) there is a strong chance of a serious defect on the baby; (2) a women is married and wants no more children; (3) woman's health is seriously endangered; (4) woman has a low income and can not afford more children; (5) woman is pregnant as a result of rape; (6) woman is not married and is single; (7) woman wants an abortion for any reason. An answer of "No" was coded as 1 and an answer of "Yes" to any of the above statements was coded as 0. Thus, higher values indicate less pro-choice. The mean score on this index was 2.560 (SD = 2.162). A Cronbach's alpha of 0.94 indicates acceptable reliability for this measure (see Table 17, Appendix A). This variable was also included in multivariate analysis and in the OLS regression model.

Table 6:
Percentages and Significance of Demographic Variables on American Attitudes about Whether Abortion is Right or Wrong (Abortion Index)

Demographic Variable:	Most Pro-Choice	1	2	3	4	5	Least Pro-Choice	Total %	Freq.	Chi Sq. (DF)	Sig.	Cramer's V	Gamma	Missing / NR
Sex (SEX)														
Male	32.9	7.8	8.1	18.1	11.4	11.6	10.2	100.0	401	9.525	0.146	0.105	0.075	901
Female	30.1	6.3	6.0	20.5	13.1	8.7	15.2	100.0	457	(6)				1055
Age (CAGE)														
18-89	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	849	106.669 (54)	0.000	0.144	-0.102	1965
Race and Ethnicity (RACETH6)														
White	34.0	5.7	6.2	20.1	12.1	9.6	12.2	100.0	613	60.683	0.001	0.119	0.089	1385
Black	27.3	11.3	9.8	14.9	11.8	12.0	12.9	100.0	90	(30)				219
Other	54.6	6.4	0.0	3.2	9.6	26.1	0.0	100.0	14					32
Hispanic	21.4	13.9	12.5	19.5	12.5	4.2	16.0	100.0	66					165
N. American	15.8	4.2	4.3	33.4	23.0	7.5	11.8	100.0	44					77
Asian	26.3	9.4	9.4	4.7	1.6	21.9	26.6	100.0	29					77
Level of Education (DEGREE)														
LTHS	9.6	7.2	12.4	25.4	15.5	9.7	20.2	100.0	857	94.399 (24)	0.000	0.166	-0.244	1957
High School	27.6	7.2	7.9	20.3	13.6	10.6	12.8							
JR College	29.9	16.8	5.0	14.9	13.4	5.0	15.0							
Bachelor	40.3	4.2	3.5	17.5	12.1	12.0	10.4							
Graduate	63.2	4.2	3.1	13.7	1.6	7.4	6.8							
Income Level (CINCOME)														
$0-5162,607-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	858	81.165 (36)	0.000	0.126	-0.128	1957
Religion (RELIG6)														
Protestant	25.6	6.6	7.4	22.1	12.0	11.5	14.8	100.0	452	73.244	0.000	0.174	-	992
Catholic	25.1	8.8	7.0	18.6	17.6	11.8	11.2	100.0	212	(18)				481
Jew	84.9	0.0	0.0	7.4	0.0	0.0	7.7	100.0	12					45
None	54.6	8.1	4.8	15.5	7.5	1.8	7.7	100.0	126					268
Region of the U.S. (REGION)[6]														
New Eng.	43.9	4.8	14.1	11.0	6.2	10.8	9.2	100.0	30	83.464	0.001	0.127		71
Mid. Atl.	36.7	9.2	8.4	12.2	9.7	8.4	15.3	100.0	114	(48)				281
EN Cen.	20.2	3.0	4.8	32.3	11.0	14.1	14.5	100.0	137					331
WN Cen.	30.6	2.7	6.8	24.1	15.3	12.3	8.2	100.0	69					123
S. Atlantic	31.7	7.7	6.5	23.4	13.5	8.2	9.1	100.0	194					408
ES Cen.	25.6	0.9	4.6	18.2	15.5	12.0	23.3	100.0	51					110
WSCen.	23.3	8.8	7.8	16.1	16.8	6.1	21.2	100.0	85					218
Mountain	39.9	11.5	6.6	14.9	12.2	8.2	6.7	100.0	64					120
Pacific	40.3	10.2	8.2	9.0	9.4	11.5	11.4	100.0	113					293
Rural (constructed from SRCBELT)														
Urban	31.9	6.8	5.5	18.7	14.2	9.1	13.8	100.0	424	6.670	0.352	0.088	0.020	955
Rural	30.9	7.1	8.5	20.1	10.5	10.9	12.0	100.0	433	(6)				1002

[6] U.S. States by Region: New Englad (MA); Mid Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA); E. North Central (IL, IN, OH, WI); W. North Central (MN, MO); S. Atlantic (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, VA); E. South Central (AL, KY, TN); W. South Central (TX, AR, LA, OK); Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, NV, NM); Pacific (CA, HI, OR, WA)

Control Variables: Religious Affiliation, Race/Ethnicity, Sex, Age, Family Income, Education, Region, and Rural/Urban

To assess differences across religious affiliation in analyzing the impact of religiosity on American social attitudes, I used the variable RELIG which asks for respondent's religious preferences. Because this variable is inclusive of a number of religious affiliations, I created a dummy variable consisting of respondents identifying as Protestant, Catholic, Jew, or not religiously affiliated. Moreover, I created an individuals dummy variable for Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and the not religiously affiliated out of the original RELIG variable, in order to conduct OLS regression models. I coded each of these specific groups as '1' and all other religious groups '0' as my reference groups.

To analyze differences in religiosity and perceived social attitudes across racial/ethnic lines, I used the variable RACETH6 which comprises of white, black, Hispanic, Native American, and Asian respondents. I created a dummy variable from the variable RACETH6 for white respondents, black respondents, and Hispanic respondents each, in order to conduct OLS regression models.

Bivariate analyses were also conducted using the demographic variables SEX, AGE, and REALINC, respectively. The variable AGE was grouped into categories consisting of (0) 18-24 years, (1) 25-29 years, (2) 30-34 years, (3) 35-39 years, (4) 40-44 years, (5) 45-49 years, (6) 50-54 years, (7) 55-59 years, (8) 60-64 years, and (9) 65 years and over. A new variable CAGE was created to solely consist of these age categories. The variable REALINC was grouped into categories consisting of (1) less than $9,999, (2) $10,000 to $14,999, (3) $15,000 to $24,999, (4) 25,000 to $34,999, (5) $35,000 to $49,999, (6) $50,000 to $99,999, and (7) $100,000 or more. A new variable CINCOME

was created to comprise these income categories. The variables SEX, CAGE, and CINCOME were included in OLS regression models.

Because the literature suggests that education also has a significant impact on the development of either conservative or liberal social attitudes, analysis were also controlled for education using the variable DEGREE – which measures the level of education a respondent has acquired. The education categories include: less than high school education, high school education, junior college education, bachelors degree, or graduate/professional degree. This variable was included in OLS regression models.

To assess social attitude differences across regions of the United States, I used the variable REGION, which asks respondents to identify the region of the U.S. they reside in. The region of interest for this thesis is the West South Central, which includes the States of Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana and Oklahoma. A dummy variable was constructed from the variable REGION, coding W.S. Central as '1' and all other regions as '0' as reference categories.

In addition, a variable which measures urban or rural areas of the U.S. was constructed from the variable SRCBELT. I coded rural areas as "1" and urban areas as "0" or the reference category.

Chapter 7: Findings

As noted in the previous chapter, U.S. General Social Survey data of 2004 was used to run univariate, bivariate crosstabulations, and OLS regression models for this honors thesis.

Demographic Background (Control) *Variables*

Univariate analysis results for demographic background or control variables are recorded in Table 4. Findings suggest that 46.3 and 53.4 percent of the total number of people surveyed in 2004 were male and female respectively. The average age of the subjects surveyed was 44 years. Since the standard deviation (16.425) of the age of respondents is less that the average age of 44, the data series is uniform or less spread.

Of the population surveyed in 2004, 71% identified as white, 11.0% identified as being black, 1.7% self-identified as some other race, 8.2% identified as Hispanic, 4.3% identified as being Native American, and 3.8% identified as being Asian (see Table 4).

Results indicate that 12.2% of respondents held a less than high school education, 51.4% held a high school education, 7.8% held a junior college education, 18.7% held a Bachelors degree, and 9.9% held a graduate or professional degree (see Table 4). The median income of respondents surveyed was between $25,000 and $34,999.

As per religious affiliation, 55.8% of the subjects surveyed identified as Protestant, 26.8% as Catholic, 2.2% as Jewish, and 15.2% identified with no religious institution. These statistics thus suggest that Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism are the three major religions in the United States (see Table 4).

Table 4:
Demographic Background (Control) Variables

Variables:	Frequency Totals:	Valid Percent:
SEX (SEX)	**2814***	**100.0**
Male	1302	46.3
Female	1512	53.7
AGE (CAGE)	**2814***	100.0
Mean: 44.733		
Standard deviation: 16.425		
RACE & ETHNICITY (RACETH6)	**2813***	100.0
White	1998	71.0
Black	309	11.0
Other	47	1.7
Hispanic	232	8.2
Native American	121	4.3
Asian	106	3.8
LEVEL OF EDUCATION (DEGREE)	**2813***	100.0
Less than High School	343	12.2
High School	1446	51.4
Junior College	221	7.8
Bachelor	526	18.7
Graduate	279	9.9
INCOME LEVEL (CINCOME)	**2455***	100.0
Mean: 3.569[2]		
Standard deviation: 2.045		
Median: 4.00		
RELIGION (RELIG6)	**2590***	100.0
Protestant	1445	55.8
Catholic	693	26.8
Jew	58	2.2
None	394	15.2
REGION (REGION)[3]	**2815***	100.0
New England	101	3.6
Mid. Atlantic	396	14.1
E. North Central	468	16.6
W. North Central	193	6.8
S. Atlantic	603	21.4
E. South Central	161	5.7
W. South Central (Texas)	303	10.8
Mountain	184	6.6
Pacific	406	14.4
RURAL (constructed from SRCBELT)	**2765***	100.0
Urban	1333	48.2
Rural	1432	51.8

* Frequency totals do not include missing values

[2] These values are according to the categorical value of each income category constructed (i.e. 1 = $0-$9,999; 2 = $10,000-$14,999; see Methods chapter)

[3] U.S. States by Region: New England (MA); Mid Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA); E. North Central (IL, IN, OH, WI); W. North Central (MN, MO); S. Atlantic (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, VA); E. South Central (AL, KY, TN); W. South Central (TX, AR, LA, OK); Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, NV, NM); Pacific (CA, HI, OR, WA)

Region[4] of the U.S. is also an integral demographic variable as it will allow the assessment of differences in social attitudes across U.S. regional boundaries. In 2004, 3.6% of the surveyed subjects lived in New England, 14.1% lived in the Mid Atlantic, 16.6% lived in the East North Central region of the U.S., 6.8% lived in the West North Central region, 21.4% lived in the South Atlantic, 5.7% lived in the East South Central region, 10.8% lived in the West South Central, 6.6% lived in the Mountain region, and 14.4% lived in the Pacific region of the United States. The region of interest for this thesis is the West South Central region which includes the State of Texas (see Table 4).

The last of demographic variables is one measuring rural or urban areas. This particular variable was constructed from the GSS variable labeled SRCBELT. Of those surveyed in 2004, 48.2% of respondents lived in an urban area and 51.8% lived in rural areas of the United States.

American Attitudes about Homosexuality: The Impact of the Demographic Variables

A variable measuring respondents' attitude about whether homosexual sex relations among consenting adults is right or wrong was used, with four possible answers ranging from always wrong to not wrong at all, to run bivariate analyses with the demographic variables denoted (see Table 5).

Although there is no statistical significance in the relationship between attitudes about homosexuality and respondent's sex, males express slightly more homophobic attitudes than females in that 59.3% of males surveyed in 2004 felt that homosexual sex relations are always wrong. Alternatively, 57.2% of females expressed homophobic

[4] U.S. States by Region: New England (MA); Mid. Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA); East North Central (IL, IN, OH, WI); West North Central (MN, MO); South Atlantic (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, VA); East South Central (AL, KY, TN); West South Central (TX, AR, LA, OK); Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, NV, NM); and Pacific (CA, HI, OR, WA)

Table 5:

Percentages and Significance of Demographic Variables on American Attitudes about Whether Homosexual Sex Relations among Consenting Adults is Right or Wrong

Demographic Variable:	Always Wrong	Almost Always Wrong	Sometimes Wrong	Not Wrong	Total %	Freq.	Chi Sq. (DF)	Sig.	Cramer's V	Gamma	Missing/Non Responsive
Sex (SEX)											
Male	59.3	5.5	7.0	28.2	100.0	401	1.790	0.617	0.046	0.053	901
Female	57.2	4.2	6.8	31.8	100.0	448	(3)				1064
Age (CAGE)											
18-24	52.6	6.1	9.6	31.8	100.0	107	35.565	0.69	0.123	-0.072	218
25-29	50.1	3.4	9.6	36.9	100.0	82	(27)				194
30-34	57.5	1.7	8.4	32.4	100.0	83					195
35-39	64.4	3.0	1.5	31.0	100.0	92					173
4044	68.7	4.7	1.0	25.7	100.0	100					211
4549	53.3	5.0	8.1	33.6	100.0	75					227
50-54	50.4	4.7	9.1	35.8	100.0	77					180
55-59	50.6	6.7	7.9	34.8	100.0	76					172
60-64	60.7	6.7	3.4	29.1	100.0	55					127
65+	68.3	6.8	10.0	14.9	100.0	102					258
Race and Ethnicity (RACETH6)											
White	52.5	5.4	7.8	34.4	100.0	598	52.647	0.000	0.144	-	1400
Black	82.4	5.0	0.5	12.1	100.0	91	(15)				218
Other	61.5	0.0	16.1	22.5	100.0	14					32
Hispanic	68.3	0.7	2.6	28.5	100.0	70					161
N. American	72.4	4.3	13.7	9.7	100.0	44					77
Asian	51.7	6.1	4.6	37.7	100.0	30					76
Level of Education (Degree)											
LT HS	76.4	4.3	4.2	15.1	100.0	99	76.470	0.000	0.173	0.361	244
High School	64.0	4.4	5.3	26.3	100.0	453	(12)				993
JR College	62.0	6.3	4.0	27.7	100.0	59					162
Bachelor	45.7	5.2	7.9	41.1	100.0	148					377
Graduate	26.0	6.3	18.2	49.6	100.0	90					189
Income Category (CINCOME)											
0-9999	72.7	3.4	5.4	18.5	100.0	231	66.883	0.000	0.162	0.271	527
10000-14999	54.9	10.4	8.0	26.7	100.0	57	(18)				132
15000-24999	58.2	9.1	5.0	27.7	100.0	148					273
25000-34999	61.0	1.3	7.2	30.5	100.0	142					311
35000-49999	53.5	2.2	8.3	36.0	100.0	129					340
50000-99999	37.3	4.2	8.0	50.5	100.0	46					133
100000+	37.0	7.6	9.9	45.5	100.0	95					249
Religion (RELIG6)											
Protestant	69.0	4.5	6.0	20.5	100.0	449	93.070	0.000	0.198	-	995
Catholic	53.4	6.7	8.2	31.7	100.0	205	(9)				488
Jew	32.4	0.0	0.0	67.6	100.0	13					45
None	27.0	3.8	9.8	59.4	100.0	124					270
Region of the U.S. (REGION)[5]											
New Eng.	41.8	0.0	15.5	42.6	100.0	24	50.189	0.001	0.140	-	77
Mid. Atl.	52.6	2.8	6.5	38.1	100.0	116	(24)				280
EN Cen.	53.5	8.3	10.7	27.5	100.0	138					330
WN Cen.	52.8	2.7	7.5	36.9	100.0	69					124
S. Atlantic	66.6	4.4	5.4	23.6	100.0	190					413
ES Cen.	68.5	4.5	8.9	18.1	100.0	52					109
WS Cen.	75.8	0.6	2.9	20.7	100.0	81					222
Mountain	51.5	6.5	7.8	34.3	100.0	65					119
Pacific	48.6	8.1	4.5	38.9	100.0	144					292
Rural (constructed from SRCBELT)											
Urban	57.1	5.1	7.0	30.8	100.0	416	0.450	0.930	0.023	0.036	1965
Rural	59.2	4.6	6.8	29.4	100.0	433	(3)				

[5] U.S. States by Region: New Englad (MA); Mid. Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA); E. North Central (IL, IN, OH. WI); W. North Central (MN, MO); S. Atlantic (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, VA); E. South Central (AL, KY, TN); W. South Central (TX, AR, LA, OK); Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, NV, NM); Pacific (CA, HI, OR, WA)

attitudes. In addition, 31.8% of females felt that homosexual sex relations are not wrong at all when compared to 28.2% of males. The strength of relationship between attitudes about homosexuality and respondent's sex is negligible as measured a Cramer's V value of 0.046 and Gamma value of 0.053 (see Table 5).

Because there was a large array of values for respondents' ages (ranging from 18 to 89), a bivariate break down of each age category and attitudes about homosexuality was not conducted. The relationship between respondents' age and attitudes about homosexuality is however weak as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.123 and Gamma value of 0.072 and thus not statistically significant. This finding suggests that a respondent's age is a not good predictor of what attitude he or she may have regarding homosexuality (see Table 5).

As per attitudes about homosexuality across racial and ethnic lines, individuals who self-identified as white held less homophobic attitudes. In the contrary, 82.4% of blacks and 68.2% of Hispanics expressed the most homophobic attitudes of all races/ethnicities recorded in the General Social Survey. Thus, white respondents are more likely than Hispanics and Blacks to believe that homosexual sex relations among consenting adults are not wrong at all. The strength of the relationship between race and ethnicity and attitudes about homosexuality however, is low as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.114 (see Table 5).

Results indicate that as the level of education a respondent has increases, so do liberal attitudes about homosexuality. For example, of respondents with a less than high school education, 76.4% believed that homosexuality is always wrong whereas only 26.0% of respondents with a graduate education hold the similar belief. The relationship

between respondent's level of education and attitudes about homosexuality is moderate as measured by Cramer's V value of 0.173 and Gamma value of 0.361. The relationship between the two variables is not statistically significant (see Table 5).

The impact of respondent's income level on attitudes about homosexuality was moderate as measured by Cramer's V value of 0.162 and Gamma value of 0.271. A bivariate break down of each income level and attitudes about homosexuality was not conducted given the extensive range of income categories ($0 to $162,607 (see Table 5).

Bivariate analyses between respondent's self-professed, religious affiliation and attitudes about homosexuality had an interesting turn out. As noted earlier, this honors thesis only takes interest on respondent's affiliation to either Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, or no religious affiliation – as the three religious groups are the largest in the U.S. Of the three religious groups, individuals who were Protestant were more likely to express homophobic attitudes with 69.0% of Protestants believing that homosexual sex relations among consenting adults is always wrong. As expected and suggested by the literature, individuals of Jewish faith held more liberal attitudes with 67.9% of Jews believing that homosexual sex relations among consenting adults is not wrong at all. Interestingly, individuals who professed no religious affiliation were most liberal with only 27.0% believing that homosexual sex relations among consenting adults is always wrong. The strength of the relationship between religious affiliation and attitudes about homosexuality is moderate as measured by Cramer's V value of 0.198 (see Table 5).

Although there are nine different regions that comprise the United States, this thesis will particularly focus on the West South Central region of the U.S. to thus compare it to other regions. Interestingly, the West South Central region of the U.S., held

the most homophobic attitudes about homosexuality when compared to other regions. Out of the surveyed and who resided in the West South Central region, 75.8% believed that homosexual sex relations among consenting adults is always wrong. Alternatively, the region with the least homophobic attitudes or who believed that homosexual relations were not wrong at all was the New England region of the U.S. (region which is composed of Massachusetts). The strength of the relationship between region of the U.S. and attitudes about homosexuality however, is low as measured by Cramer's V value of 0.140 (see Table 5).

Although the relationship is not statistically significant, when distinguishing areas of the U.S. between urban and rural, respondents residing in rural areas are more likely to hold homophobic views than respondents living in urban areas. In addition, 30.8% of respondents residing in urban areas believed that homosexual relations between consenting adults was not wrong at all, when compared to 29.4% of respondents residing in rural areas. Nevertheless, the strength of the relationship between urban/rural and attitudes about homosexuality is negligible as measured by Cramer's V value of 0.023 and Gamma value of 0.036 (see Table 5).

American Attitudes about Abortion: The Impact of the Demographic Variables

Table 6 illustrates bivariate findings of the impact of the demographic variables on American attitudes about abortion. An index containing 7 items that measured American attitudes about abortion was used, with possible answers ranging from most pro-choice to least pro-choice (see Appendix A).

Between the sexes, females held the most pro-choice attitudes, with 51.1% of respondents who hold the most .pro-choice attitudes being female compared to 48.9% being male. Interestingly, when analyzing the percentages across the possible range of

Table 6:
Percentages and Significance of Demographic Variables on American Attitudes about, Whether Abortion is Right or Wrong (Abortion index)

Demographic Variable:	Most Pro-Choice	1	2	3	4	5	Least Pro-choice	Total %	Freq.	Chi Sq. (DF)	Sig.	Cramer's V	Gamma	Missing / NR
Sex (SEX)														
Male	32.9	7.8	8.1	18.1	11.4	11.6	10.2	100.0	401	9.525	0.146	0.105	0.075	901
Female	30.1	6.3	6.0	20.5	13.1	8.7	15.2	100.0	457	(6)				1055
Age (CAGE)														
18-24	14.1	3.9	10.1	26.6	14.6	14.6	16.0	100.0	105	106.669	0.000	0.144	-0.102	220
25-29	28.8	9.1	5.7	26.3	9.3	6.3	14.4	100.0	82	(54)				194
30-34	30.4	3.9	6.7	16.6	20.0	11.2	11.2	100.0	83					194
35-39	32.0	2.9	4.4	20.6	16.1	13.3	10.7	100.0	95					170
40-44	30.4	10.5	11.4	13.9	6.5	12.5	14.9	100.0	101					210
45-49	41.5	5.0	5.0	17.3	11.2	10.7	9.4	100.0	74					228
50-54	50.2	0.6	5.7	12.5	10.5	5.6	14.9	100.0	75					182
55-59	27.1	15.6	0.0	17.0	6.8	13.4	20.1	100.0	77					171
60-64	45.3	12.7	5.6	13.5	10.4	4.5	7.9	100.0	59					124
65+	27.1	7.5	11.1	24.9	15.6	5.7	8.1	100.0	105					255
Race and Ethnicity (RACETH6)														
White	34.0	5.7	6.2	20.1	12.1	9.6	12.2	100.0	613	60.683	0.001	0.119	0.089	1385
Black	27.3	11.3	9.8	14.9	11.8	12.0	12.9	100.0	90	(30)				219
Other	54.6	6.4	0.0	3.2	9.6	26.1	0.0	100.0	14					32
Hispanic	21.4	13.9	12.5	19.5	12.5	4.2	16.0	100.0	66					165
N. American	15.8	4.2	4.3	33.4	23.0	7.5	11.8	100.0	44					77
Asian	26.3	9.4	9.4	4.7	1.6	21.9	26.6	100.0	29					77
Level of Education (DEGREE)														
LTHS	9.6	7.2	12.4	25.4	15.5	9.7	20.2	100.0	102	94.399	0.000	0.166	-0.244	241
High School	27.6	7.2	7.9	20.3	13.6	10.6	12.8	100.0	464	(24)				982
JR College	29.9	16.8	5.0	14.9	13.4	5.0	15.0	100.0	56					165
Bachelor	40.3	4.2	3.5	17.5	12.1	12.0	10.4	100.0	146					379
Graduate	63.2	4.2	3.1	13.7	1.6	7.4	6.8	100.0	89					190
Income Level (CINCOME)														
0-9999	21.2	8.1	10.5	18.6	15.2	11.0	15.5	100.0	235	81.165	0.000	0.126	-0.128	524
10000-14999	21.2	4.7	2.3	34.2	9.5	12.7	7.2	100.0	59	(36)				130
15000-24999	29.4	3.5	10.0	20.4	8.2	5.9	18.5	100.0	144					277
25000-34999	33.5	11.6	5.1	20.2	8.4	12.1	13.0	100.0	148					305
35000-49999	29.6	8.6	4.3	18.8	17.3	10.8	9.7	100.0	130					339
50000-99999	30.7	4.1	0.0	12.3	9.3	13.4	9.2	100.0	45					134
100000+	51.7	2.8	6.7	13.9	13.7	6.7	7.7	100.0	97					247
Religion (RELIG6)														
Protestant	25.6	6.6	7.4	22.1	12.0	11.5	14.8	100.0	452	73.244	0.000	0.174	-	992
Catholic	25.1	8.8	7.0	18.6	17.6	11.8	11.2	100.0	212	(18)				481
Jew	84.9	0.0	0.0	7.4	0.0	0.0	7.7	100.0	12					45
None	54.6	8.1	4.8	15.5	7.5	1.8	7.7	100.0	126					268
Region of the U.S. (REGION)[6]														
New Eng.	43.9	4.8	14.1	11.0	6.2	10.8	9.2	100.0	30	83.464	0.001	0.127	-	71
Mid. Atl.	36.7	9.2	8.4	12.2	9.7	8.4	15.3	100.0	114	(48)				281
EN Cen.	20.2	3.0	4.8	32.3	11.0	14.1	14.5	100.0	137					331
WN Cen.	30.6	2.7	6.8	24.1	15.3	12.3	8.2	100.0	69					123
S. Atlantic	31.7	7.7	6.5	23.4	13.5	8.2	9.1	100.0	194					408
ES Cen.	25.6	0.9	4.6	18.2	15.5	12.0	23.3	100.0	51					110
WSCen.	23.3	8.8	7.8	16.1	16.8	6.1	21.2	100.0	85					218
Mountain	39.9	11.5	6.6	14.9	12.2	8.2	6.7	100.0	64					120
Pacific	40.3	10.2	8.2	9.0	9.4	11.5	11.4	100.0	113					293
Rural (constructed from SRCBELT)														
Urban	31.9	6.8	5.5	18.7	14.2	9.1	13.8	100.0	424	6.670	0.352	0.088	0.020	955
Rural	30.9	7.1	8.5	20.1	10.5	10.9	12.0	100.0	433	(6)				1002

[6] U.S. States by Region: New England (MA); Mid. Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA); E. North Central (IL, IN, OH, WI); W. North Central (MN, MO); S. Atlantic (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, VA); E. South Central (AL, KY, TN); W. South Central (TX, AR, LA, OK); Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, NV, NM); Pacific (CA, HI, OR, WA)

answers regarding abortion, most of the people surveyed held middle-road attitudes. As per the strength of the relationship between the sex of the respondent and attitudes about abortion, a Cramer's v value of 0.105 and Gamma value of 0.075 suggests that the relationship is low (see Table 6).

The strength of the relationship between age of the respondent surveyed and attitudes about abortion is low as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.144 and Gamma value of 0.102. What this suggests is that the age of the respondent does not have significant impact on what his or her attitudes about abortion will be. (see Table 6)

Of the people surveyed in 2004 and who self-identified as being white, 34.0% held strong pro-choice attitudes – the strongest of all races and ethnicities. Of Hispanics surveyed on the other hand, only **21.4%** held most pro-choice attitudes whereas 27.3% of blacks also strongly believed abortion was not wrong. In addition, 16.0% of Hispanics strongly believed abortion was wrong, compared to 12.2% of whites and 12.9% of blacks. The strength of the relationship between race/ethnicity and attitudes about abortion is low, as measured by Cramer's V value of 0.119 and Gamma value of 0.089 (see Table 6).

As per attitudes about abortion and level of education a respondent has, a Cramer's V value of 0.166 and Gamma value of **0.244** suggests a moderate relationship. This finding is not at all surprising, as the literature suggests that education does impact respondent's views about abortion. For example, the literature suggests that as an individual acquires more education, let's say a college degree, his or her attitudes regarding contentious social issues will be tend to be more liberal and / or open-minded,

for that matter. However, the precise impact of education level on attitudes about abortion will be clear in the regression analysis (see Table 6).

Findings suggest that the relationship between income level and attitudes about abortion is not statistically significant and low, as measured by Cramer's V value of 0.126 and Gamma value of 0.128 (see Table 6).

Religious affiliation on the other hand, had an interesting impact on attitudes about abortion. Of the surveyed, the religious group that held the most pro-choice attitudes was Judaism (84.9%), followed by Protestantism (25.6%) and Catholicism (25.1%). Interestingly, of the individuals who professed no religious affiliation, 54.6% held strong pro-choice attitudes. As expected, the religious group that held the least pro-choice attitudes was Protestants (14.8%), followed by Catholics (11.2%), Jews (7.7%), and the not religiously affiliated (7.7%). The strength of the relationship between religious affiliation and American attitudes about abortion is moderate, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.174.

When comparing regions of the United States and their respective constituents' view over the morality of abortion, the West South Central region held the second strongest, least pro-choice attitudes with 21.2% of respondents strongly believing abortion is wrong. As with attitudes about homosexuality, Massachusetts held the most liberal views over abortion, with 43.9% of the respondents holding strong pro-choice attitudes. The strength of the relationship between region of the U.S. and attitudes about the morality of abortion is low, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.127 (see Table 6).

Although the relationship between urban/rural areas of the U.S. and attitudes about abortion is negligible (Cramer's V value of **0.088** and Gamma value of 0.020), **31.9%** of individuals who live U.S. urban areas hold strong pro-choice attitudes when compared to **30.9%** of individuals who reside in rural areas. When considering least pro-choice attitudes, **13.8%** of urban residents strongly believed that abortion is wrong whereas only **12.0%** of rural resident held that believe. (See Table ***6)***

American Attitudes about Immigration: The Impact of the Demographic Variables

As noted in the methods section of my thesis, I constructed an index that measures American attitudes about immigration. Because of variable constraints, the variable make-up and analysis of this immigration index reflects American attitudes during the year of **1994.** (See Table **7)**

Bivariate analysis between sex and attitudes about immigration suggest that both males and females exhibit conservative views about immigration **(74.2%** and **77.1%** respectively). Only **25.8%** of males surveyed in **1994** disagreed with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society, whereas only **22.9%** of females held the same belief. Yet, the strength of the relationship between sex and immigration attitudes is low, as measured by Cramer's V value of **0.084** and Gamma value of 0.123. Interestingly, age of the respondent survey also had a low association with attitudes about immigration, as measured by Cramer's V value of **0.089** and Gamma value of **0.027** (see Table **7).**

Across racial/ethnic lines, all racial/ethnic groups believed that immigrants have a negative impact on American society. Specifically, **74.9%** of white respondents, **84.7%** of black respondents, and **64.5%** of Hispanic respondents believed that immigrants in fact, have a negative impact on American society. On the alternative, only 25.1% of

white respondents, **15.3%** of black respondents, and **35.5%** of Hispanic respondents disagreed with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society. Although the analysis provided interesting results, the strength of the relationship between the two variables, racelethnicity and attitudes about immigration, is low as measured by a Cramer's V value of **0.097** (see Table **7).**

Respondent's level of education shares a low relationship with attitudes about immigration, as measured by a Cramer's V value of **0.117** and Gamma value of 0.246. Similarly, income level shares a low relationship with attitudes about immigration (Cramer's V = **0.083;** Gamma = **0.144)** (see Table **7).**

Interestingly, all religious groups expressed a negative attitude toward immigrants to the U.S. Specifically, **78.3%** of Protestants, **75.5%** of Catholics, and **62.9%** of Jews believe that immigrants have a negative impact on American society. Of those individuals who professed no religious affiliation, **70.9%** believed that immigrants have a negative impact on American society. On the alternative, only **21.7%** of Protestants, **24.6%** of Catholics, and **37.2%** of Jews held positive attitudes toward immigrants. The strength of the relationship between racelethnicity and my immigration index however, is negligible as measured by a Cramer's V value of **0.055** (see Table **7).**

As with the previous demographic variables, all regions professed a negative attitude majority toward immigrants. Of the West South Central population, **80.5%** believed that immigrants have a negative impact on American society whereas only **19.5%** held liberal attitudes about immigration. The strength of the relationship between region of the U.S. and attitudes about immigration is negligible as measured by Cramer's V value of **0.095** (see Table **7).**

Table 7:
Percentages and Significance of Demographic Variables on American Attitudes about Whether Immigrants Have a Negative Impact on American Society (Immigration Index)[7]

Demographic Variable	Disagree	1	2	Agree	Total %	Freq.	Chi Sq. (DF)	Sig.	Cramer's V	Gamma	Missing / NR
Sex (SEX):											
Male	5.5	20.3	60.2	14.0	100.0	600	8.956	0.030	0.084	0.123	19889
Female	4.3	18.6	57.0	20.1	100.0	681					25343
Age (CAGE)											
18-24	4.1	14.3	56.1	25.5	100.0	98	30.684	0.284	0.089	-0.024	4986
25-29	5.1	19.0	61.3	14.6	100.0	137	(27)				5110
30-34	4.9	17.6	57.7	19.8	100.0	182					5093
35-39	4.4	20.8	56.6	18.2	100.0	159					4795
40-44	7.6	26.5	50.0	15.9	100.0	132					4321
45-49	2.9	24.8	55.5	16.8	100.0	137					3790
50-54	3.7	22.9	63.3	10.1	100.0	109					3370
55-59	4.9	17.3	65.4	12.3	100.0	81					3045
60-64	3.4	15.5	56.9	24.1	100.0	58					2745
65+	5.9	14.4	63.1	16.6	100.0	187					7814
Race and Ethnicity (RACETH6)											
White	5.3	19.8	60.1	14.8	100.0	986	35.877	0.002	0.097	-	35427
Black	3.2	12.1	55.4	29.3	100.0	157	(15)				5152
Other	0.0	25.0	41.7	33.3	100.0	12					380
Hispanic	6.5	29.0	46.8	17.7	100.0	62					2176
Native American	0.0	21.3	59.6	19.1	100.0	47					1503
Asian	5.9	23.5	41.2	29.4	100.0	17					588
Level of Education (DEGREE)											
LT High School	4.4	9.4	58.3	27.8	100.0	180	52.508	0.000	0.117	-0.246	10818
High School	4.3	18.5	60.0	17.2	100.0	698	(12)				23366
JR College	4.5	14.9	61.2	19.4	100.0	67					2159
Bachelor	5.9	24.3	57.3	12.6	100.0	239					5968
Graduate	7.5	36.6	49.5	6.5	100.0	93					2765
Income Level (CINCOME)											
0-9999	4.2	15.3	57.3	23.1	100.0	307	26.365	0.034	0.083	-0.144	12299
10000-14999	4.3	12.1	62.1	21.4	100.0	140	(15)				4720
15000-24999	4.8	21.0	57.7	16.5	100.0	310					8595
25000-34999	5.4	23.0	58.2	13.4	100.0	239					7239
35000-49999	5.2	20.6	64.9	9.3	100.0	97					6051
50000-99999	5.3	23.9	55.9	14.9	100.0	188					4878
100000+	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0					1450
Religion (RELIG6)											
Protestant	3.9	17.8	59.2	19.1	100.0	742	11.095	0.269	0.055	-	27295
Catholic	5.1	19.5	60.2	15.3	100.0	334	(9)				11234
Jew	8.6	28.6	54.3	8.6	100.0	35					953
None	6.7	22.5	56.7	14.2	100.0	120					4177
Region of the U.S. (REGION)'											
New Eng.	8.8	31.6	54.4	5.3	100.0	57	34.756	0.072	0.095	-	2246
Mid. Atl.	2.2	18.9	60.0	18.9	100.0	180	(24)				6989
EN Cen.	5.5	17.5	57.0	20.0	100.0	200					8508
WN Cen.	7.8	24.5	60.8	6.9	100.0	102					3492
S. Atlantic	6.0	15.4	59.4	19.2	100.0	266					8308
ES Cen.	1.5	18.2	60.6	19.7	100.0	66					3056
WSCen.	2.3	17.2	61.7	18.8	100.0	128					4121
Mountain	4.4	20.9	58.2	16.5	100.0	91					2540
Pacific	5.2	22.5	54.5	17.8	100.0	191					5971
Rural (constructed from SRCBELT)											
Urban	4.0	21.9	55.1	18.9	100.0	671	11.321	0.010	0.094	0.006	876
Rural	5.7	16.7	62.1	15.4	100.0	610	(3)				835

[7] Results are reflective of the year 1994 rather than 2004 because immigration index is only available for 1994.
[8] U.S. States by Region: New Englad (MA); Mid. Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA); E. North Central (IL, IN, OH, WI); W. North Central (MN, MO); S. Atlantic (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, VA); E. South Central (AL, KY, TN); W. South Central (TX, AR, LA, OK); Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, NV, NM); Pacific (CA, HI, OR, WA)

American Attitudes about Family Values: The Impact of the Demographic Variables

Table 8 illustrates the crosstabulations between the family values index and the demographic variables. As noted in the methods.section of my thesis, the family values index, which measures American attitudes about whether people benefit from a traditional family composition, is comprised of five items ranging from disagree to agree. Because of variable constraints, the variable make-up of the family values index and demographic variables used for the following bivariate analysis reflect American attitudes during the year of 1996 (see Table 8).

Interestingly, both sexes held similar, strong conservative attitudes toward family values with 21.3% and 21.5% of males and females surveyed, respectively, agreeing with the idea that people in fact benefit from a traditional family composition. Alternatively, only 10.7% and 11.9% of males and females expressed a strong, liberal attitude about family values. Regardless of sex, a large majority of respondents were split on their attitude regarding this contentious social issue. The strength of the relationship between sex and attitudes about family values is low, as measured by Cramer's V value of 0.101 and Gamma value of 0.021 (see Table 8).

Similarly, age of respondent held a low relationship with respondent's attitude regarding family values – evidenced by a Cramer's V value of 0.127 and Gamma value of 0.132 (see Table 8).

Across racial/ethnic lines, 20.5% of white respondents, 25.7% of black respondents, and 19.2% of Hispanic respondents held strong, conservative attitudes about family values. On the alternative, a small percentage of each of these racial/ethnic groups held liberal attitudes on the benefit people have from a traditional family composition.

Table 8:
Percentages and Significance of Demographic Variables on American Attitudes about Whether People Benefit from Traditional Family Composition (Family Values Index)[9]

Demographic Variable	Disagree 1	2	3	Agree	Total	Freq.	Chi Sq. (DF)	Sig.	Cramer's V	Gamma	Missing I NR
Sex (SEX)											
Male	10.7	22.6	29.7	15.7	21.3	100.0	394	9.130	0.058	0.101	0.021	20095
Female	11.9	26.5	21.3	18.8	21.5	100.0	494	(4)				25530
Age (CAGE)											
18-24	16.0	28.4	19.8	14.8	21.0	100.0	81	56.636	0.016	0.127	0.132	5003
25-29	14.8	27.8	25.0	13.9	18.5	100.0	108	(36)				5139
30-34	12.8	31.9	29.8	17.0	8.5	100.0	94					5181
35-39	9.0	24.3	27.9	20.7	18.0	100.0	111					4843
40-44	12.0	27.0	20.0	18.0	23.0	100.0	100					4353
45-49	13.1	25.0	26.2	13.1	22.6	100.0	84					3843
50-54	14.7	28.0	13.3	16.0	28.0	100.0	75					3404
55-59	11.9	19.0	28.6	9.5	31.0	100.0	42					3084
60-64	3.5	14.0	40.4	26.3	15.8	100.0	57					2746
65+	6.9	17.6	24.4	22.1	29.0	100.0	131					7870
Race and Ethnicity (RACETH6)											
White	13.1	24.7	25.2	16.4	20.5	100.0	663	17.294	0.634	0.070	-	35750
Black	3.5	25.7	26.5	18.6	25.7	100.0	113	(20)				5196
Other	6.7	33.3	26.7	6.7	26.7	100.0	15					377
Hispanic	9.6	21.2	25.0	25.0	19.2	100.0	52					2186
Native American	6.3	25.0	18.8	25.0	25.0	100.0	32					1518
Asian	15.4	23.1	15.4	23.1	23.1	100.0	13					592
Level of Education (DEGREE)											
LT HS	6.2	21.4	24.1	22.8	25.5	100.0	145	34.877	0.004	0.099	-0.191	10853
High School	9.2	24.6	25.4	17.2	23.5	100.0	476	(16)				23588
JR College	15.9	23.8	22.2	20.6	17.5	100.0	63					2163
Bachelor	19.3	27.9	22.9	12.9	17.1	100.0	140					6067
Graduate	17.7	29.0	32.3	14.5	6.5	100.0	62					2796
Income Level (CMCOME)											
0-9999	9.0	23.1	24.9	19.5	23.5	100.0	277	13.320	0.863	0.061	-0.089	12329
10000-14999	6.8	22.0	25.4	18.6	27.1	100.0	59	(20)				4801
15000-24999	12.7	24.4	23.4	17.3	22.3	100.0	197					8708
25000-34999	10.9	27.9	25.6	15.5	20.2	100.0	129					7349
35000-49999	14.5	29.8	25.0	15.3	15.3	100.0	124					6024
50000-99999	14.7	21.6	27.5	16.7	19.6	100.0	102					4964
100000+	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0					1450
Religion (RELIG6)											
Protestant	8.2	24.3	25.1	19.5	22.8	100.0	522	20.355	0.061	0.090	-	27515
Catholic	14.2	27.5	24.2	15.6	18.5	100.0	211	(12)				11357
Jew	5.3	26.3	31.6	10.5	26.3	100.0	19					969
None	20.9	22.0	25.3	14.3	17.6	100.0	91					4206
Region of the U.S. (Region)[10]											
New Eng.	19.1	31.9	23.4	6.4	19.1	100.0	47	69.017	0.000	0.139	-	2256
Mid. Atl.	11.8	25.9	30.0	15.3	17.1	100.0	170	(32)				6999
EN Cen.	11.1	15.1	24.6	32.5	16.7	100.0	126					8582
WN Cen.	15.5	25.9	22.4	10.3	25.9	100.0	58					3536
S. Atlantic	11.9	22.7	18.8	16.5	30.1	100.0	176					8398
ES Cen.	4.7	39.1	29.7	14.1	12.5	100.0	64					3058
WSCen.	11.4	21.4	18.6	24.3	24.3	100.0	70					4179
Mountain	15.8	21.1	36.8	13.2	13.2	100.0	38					2593
Pacific	7.9	28.1	26.6	13.7	23.7	100.0	139					6023
Rural (constructed from SRCBELT)											
Urban	10.9	26.2	26.6	14.6	21.7	100.0	466	6.596	0.159	0.086	0.035	970
Rural	11.8	23.2	23.2	20.6	21.1	100.0	422	(4)				1046

[9] Results are only reflective of the year 1996 rather than 2004 due lo variable constraints.
[10] U S. States by Region: New England (MA); Mid Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA); E. North Central (IL, IN, OH, WI); W. North Central (MN, MO); S. Atlantic (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, VA); E. South Central (AL, KY, TN); W South Central (TX, AR, LA, OK); Mountain (AZ, CO. ID, NV, NM); Pacific (CA, HI, OR, WA)

The relationship between race/ethnicity and the family values index is negligible and thus not statistically significant, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.070 (see Table 8).

Education level shares a low relationship with attitudes about family values, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.099 and Gamma value of 0.191. What this finding suggests is that a respondent's level of education does not have a substantial impact on their respective attitude over family values. For example, high levels of education may not necessarily reveal liberal attitudes about family values (see Table 8).

Income levels and respondent's attitudes about family values share a low relationship (Crarner's V = 0.061 and Gamma = 0.089. This basically suggests that preliminarily, income level has little or no impact on the attitudes respondents develop over the benefit people derive from a traditional family composition. Nevertheless, the precise impact of income levels will be configured in the OLS regression analysis (see Table 8).

As with the previous social attitudes, religious affiliation had an interesting relationship with American attitudes regarding whether people benefit from traditional family composition. Of those surveyed, 22.8% of Protestants, 18.5% of Catholics, and 26.3% of Jews had a strong, conservative attitude toward family values. A small percentage of those religiously affiliation actually held a liberal attitude toward family values. Specifically, 8.2% of Protestants, 14.2% of Catholics, and 5.3% of Jews disagreed with the idea that people benefit from a traditional family composition. On the contrary, a good percentage of those not religiously affiliation also expressed strong, liberal attitudes toward family values (20.9%). Alternatively, 17.6% of those not religiously affiliated held conservative attitudes about family values. Nevertheless, the

relationship between religious affiliation and the family values index is negligible, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.090 (see Table 8).

As per region of the U.S. and respective attitudes about whether or not people benefit from a traditional family composition (family values index), of the surveyed who reside in the West South Central region of the U.S., 24.3% held strong, conservative attitudes about family values. Alternatively, only 11.4% of respondents held a strong, liberal attitude toward family values. Of all regions of the U.S., the states of Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia strongly believed that people do benefit from a traditional family composition. The strength of the relationship between region of the U.S. and attitudes about family values is actually low, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.139 (see Table 8).

When considering type of area respondents live in and the impact that has on attitudes regarding family values, 21.7% of individuals residing in urban areas held strong, conservative attitudes about family values whereas 21.1% of those residing in rural areas held similar beliefs. On the contrary, 10.9% and 11.8% of urban and rural residents, respectively, strongly disagreed with the idea that people benefit from a traditional family composition. The strength of the relationship though, between rural/urban area and the family values index, is negligible as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.086 and Gamma value of 0.035 (see Table 8).

American Attitudes ***on Homosexuality: The Impact of the Religiosity Dimensions***

Bivariate analysis between homosexuality and the religiosity dimensions suggest interesting results. As expressed in the literature review and in the methods section, this honors thesis is taking a multi-dimensional approach to the operationalization of

religiosity. Thus, various variables were used to identify each of the five religiosity dimensions: the ***intellectual, ritualistic, ideological, consequential,*** and ***experiential***. Respondents were asked to assess whether homosexual sex relations among consenting adults is right or wrong on a scale ranging from always wrong to not wrong at all. Results are recorded in Table 9.

Intellectual Religiosity

Intellectual religiosity measures the ***degree of knowledge about the formal beliefs of aperson's religion*** (Glock, 1959, 1962). As stated in the methods section, the variable Bible was used to measure this religiosity dimension. The variable Bible asks respondents to dictate whether the Bible is the Word of God, the Inspired Word of God, a book of faith, or something else (see Table 9).

Of those individuals who believed that the Bible is the Word of God, 81.6% also believed that homosexual sex relations among consenting adults is always wrong. Alternatively, only 9.9% of those who believe that the Bible is the Word of God also conceive positive attitudes about homosexuality (see Table 9).

Of the individuals who believed that the Bible is the Inspired Word of God, a lesser percentage, 50.5% professed negative attitudes about homosexuality, whereas a larger percentage hold positive attitudes about homosexuality (34.4%) – when compared to those who believe that the Bible is the Word of God (see Table 9).

Interestingly, 62.6%, or the largest percentage of positive attitudes toward homosexuality, is conceived by individuals who believe that the Bible is simply a book of faith rather than it being a divinely authoritative, Scripture. In addition, those who believe that the Bible is a book of faith also hold the lesser percentage of individuals who

Table 9:
Percentages and Significance of Independent Variables (Dimensions of Religiosity) on American Attitudes about Whether Homosexual Sex Relations among Consenting Adults is Right or Wrong

Independent Variable:	Always Wrong	Almost Always Wrong	Sometimes Wrong	Not Wrong	Total %	Freq.	Chi Sq. (DF)	Sig.	Cramer's V	Gamma	Missing/Non Responsive
Bible (BIBLE): Intellectual Religiosity											
WoG	81.6	5.5	3.1	9.9	100.0	306	160.769	0.000	0.253	-	141
Ins.WoG	50.5	5.4	9.7	34.4	100.0	384	(9)				244
BoFaith	26.3	2.8	8.3	62.6	100.0	133					73
Other	61.7	0.0	2.9	35.4	100.0	16					13
Church Attendece (ATTEND): Ritualistic (Ritual) Religiosity											
Never	36.3	3.0	6.5	54.1	100.0	121	147.630	0.000	0.241	-0.428	121
LTO YR	36.6	9.9	9.4	44.1	100.0	70	(27)				133
O YR	39.0	3.2	8.0	49.8	100.0	115					284
ST YR	56.9	0.9	6.6	35.6	100.0	100					273
O MON	59.6	6.8	9.7	23.9	100.0	62					127
2-3XMON	70.8	7.4	7.5	14.4	100.0	74					194
NR E WK	72.7	5.2	2.9	19.2	100.0	63					105
E WK	70.6	7.1	7.7	14.6	100.0	169					358
MTOWK	91.2	1.2	2.5	5.0	100.0	74					74
Pray (PRAY): Ritualistic (Devotion) Religiosity											
ST Day	73.7	3.5	5.9	16.9	100.0	276	108.406	0.000	0.206	0.399	140
O Day	63.5	6.4	5.9	24.3	100.0	223	(15)				144
ST WK	51.4	6.4	8.6	33.6	100.0	124					66
O WK	66.7	0.0	8.5	24.8	100.0	43					31
LTO WK	38.1	5.3	7.5	49.1	100.0	87					51
Never	24.0	4.8	8.8	62.4	100.0	95					42
Beliefs about God (GODCHNGE): Ideological Religiosity											
DBG, NH	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	4	30.083	0.000	0.157	-	2
DBG, UT	0.0	11.1	22.1'	66.8	100.0	4	(9)				5
BGN, DUT	50.2	0.0	17.9	31.9	100.0	29					15
BGN, AH	68.3	3.4	6.4	21.8	100.0	368					200
Strength of Affiliation (RELITEN): Consequential Religiosity											
Strong	75.5	4.3	4.3	15.9	100.0	344	111.425	0.000	0.210	0.451	731
NV Strg.	50.0	5.8	9.0	35.2	100.0	210	(9)				719
SW Strg.	61.9	5.4	5.6	27.1	100.0	67					206
No Rel.	27.0	3.8	9.8	59.4	100.0	124					270
"Born Again" Experience (REBORN): Experiential Religiosity											
Yes	78.0	I.8	5.8	14.4	100.0	288	77.179	0.000	0.303	0.551	153
No	47.3	6.5	7.6	38.6	100.0	551	(3)				319

also believe that homosexual sex relations among consenting adults is always wrong (see Table 9).

The relationship between intellectual religiosity and attitudes about homosexuality is substantially strong, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.253. What this finding suggests is that people who are intellectually religious will have a

statistically significant impact on their derived attitude about homosexuality. That is, of example, individuals who are intellectual religious at the dimension of believing that the Bible is the Word of God will likely carry homophobic attitudes. Whereas individuals who are intellectually religious at the dimension of believing that the Bible is simply a book of faith will probably cause them to believe that homosexuality is not wrong at all and thus hold liberal view over the contentious social issue. Alternatively, if individuals believe that the Bible is the inspired Word of God, they will likely be split in holding either conservative or liberal views over homosexuality – as suggested by the crosstabulations (see Table 9).

Ritualistic Religiosity: Ritual

As suggested by the literature, the ritualistic dimension of religiosity is twofold (Glock, 1959, 1962). The first area of ritualistic religiosity is ritual, which measures the rate of participation in a religious group's activities. To measure this area of the ritualistic dimension of religiosity, a variable measuring church attendance was used. Bivariate analysis of church attendance and attitudes about homosexuality are recorded in Table 9.

Incredibly interesting is the fact that of those individuals who attend church more than once a week, 91.2% believed that homosexual sex relations between two consenting adults were always wrong. **Only** 5.0% of those that attend church multiple times during the week held positive attitudes about homosexuality (see Table 9).

Of those that never attend church, 54.1% believed that homosexual sex relations are never wrong. This particular percentage is also the greatest among those that hold

positive views about homosexuality. Thus, not going to church, statistically yields more positive attitudes about homosexuality (see Table 9).

When one observes the column delineating homophobic attitudes, as individuals increase their church attendance, so does the likelihood that he or she may develop homophobic attitudes. Thus, from a statistical standpoint, the more church attendance within a population, the more homophobic attitudes. Alternatively, bivariate analysis between ritual religiosity and American attitudes about homosexuality suggest that as church attendance decreases [from observing the "not wrong" column], the percentage of positive, attitudes about homosexuality actually increases – suggesting a negative association (see Table 9).

Nevertheless, the strength of the relationship between church attendance and American attitudes about homosexuality is moderate, as suggested by a Cramer's V value of 0.241 and Gamma value of 0.428 (see Table 9).

Ritualistic Religiosity: ***Devotion***

The ***devotion*** category of the ritualistic dimension of religiosity ***stresses*** an ***informal and individualistic approach to the practice of rituals*** (Glock, 1959, 1962). To measure this area of ritualistic religiosity, a variable that measures the number of time individuals pray was used. Bivariate analyses of amount of prayer and attitudes about homosexuality are recorded in Table 9.

Interestingly, as the amount of prayer a person conducts increases, so does the percentage of individuals who believe that homosexual sex relations between two consenting adults is always wrong. Specifically, 73.7% of individuals who pray several times a day, 63.5% of individuals who pray once a day, 51.4% of those who pray several

times a week, 66.7% of individuals who pray once a week, 38.1% of individuals who prayer less than once a week, and 24.0% of individuals who never pray, hold homophobic views.

Alternatively, as the frequency of prayer decreases, the percentage of individuals who hold positive attitudes about homosexuality actually increases. Specifically, 62.4% of individuals who never pray, 49.1% of individuals who pray less than once a week, 24.8% of individuals who pray once a week, 33.6% of individuals who pray several times a week, 24.3% of individuals who pray once a day, and 16.9% of individuals who pray several times a day, held positive views about homosexuality.

It's absolutely evident that prayer, or *devotion,* has an impact on the American people's view and / or attitude over homosexuality. Therefore, individuals who are ritualistically religious as measured by praying several times a day would exhibit more homophobic attitudes.

The relationship between *devotion* and attitudes about homosexuality is moderate, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.206 and a Gamma value of 0.399.

Ideological Religiosity

The ideological religiosity dimension measures the *degree of commitment to the religious beliefs of a person's religious group* (Glock, 1959, 1962). To operationalize this concept, a variable measuring the respondent's beliefs about God was used. Crosstabulations of ideological religiosity and attitudes about homosexuality are recorded in Table 9.

Interestingly, 100% of individuals who don't currently believe and never have believed in God also believed that homosexual relations among two consenting adults are

not wrong at all. However, the frequency of cases for this statistic is quite low (4); therefore, these results are not reliable or representative of the American population as a whole.

Of respondents who currently believe and always have believed in God, 68.3% held homophobic attitudes. Alternatively, only 21.8% of those who currently believe and always have believed in God hold positive attitudes about homosexuality.

The relationship between ideological religiosity and attitudes about homosexuality is moderate as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.157.

Consequential Religiosity

Consequential religiosity refers to the impact of religious commitment and involvement on an individual's general behavior (Glock, 1959, 1962). A variable measuring strength of affiliation to a religious group was used to operationalize consequential religiosity. Results of bivariate analyses are recorded in Table 9.

As expected, individuals who profess a strong affiliation to their respective religious group were more likely to hold homophobic attitudes. Specifically, 75.5% of respondents with a strong affiliation believed that homosexual sex relations between two consenting adults is always wrong, whereas only 15.9% of them believed that homosexual sex relations were not wrong at all. Out of those that professed a not very strong affiliation, 50.0% believed held homophobic attitudes and 35.2% held positive attitudes about homosexuality. Moreover, of individuals with a *somewhat* strong affiliation, 61.9% believed that homosexual sex relations are always wrong whereas only 27.1% held positive attitudes regarding homosexuality. Individuals with no religious affiliation were more likely to hold positive attitudes about homosexuality (59.4%) when

compared to the other varying levels of strength of affiliation. Thus, individuals who are consequentially religious do hold varying degrees of attitudes about homosexuality, with individuals with religious at "strong affiliation" dimension more likely to hold homophobic views when compared to people religious at a different consequential religiosity dimension.

The strength of the relationship between consequential religiosity and American attitude is moderate, as suggested by a Cramer's V value of 0.210 and Gamma value of 0.451.

Experiential Religiosity

As denote by Glock (1959), experiential religiosity measures the degree *of emotional attachment to the supernatural* such as a mystical experience. A variable indicating whether the respondent had a religious "born again" experience was used to operationalize experiential religiosity. Results of bivariate analyses are recorded in Table 9.

Interestingly, of individuals who have experienced a "born again" experience, 78.0% held homophobic attitudes, compared to 47.3% of individuals who haven't undergone a "born again" experience. Of those who hold positive attitudes about homosexuality, 38.6% have never had a "born again" experience and only 14.4% have had a "born again" encounter. Results clearly indicate that individuals who are experientially religious at the "born again" dimension, are more likely, than those who haven't had a "born again" experience, to believe that homosexual sex relations between two consenting adults is always wrong.

The strength of the relationship between experiential religiosity and American attitudes about homosexuality is substantial, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.303 and Gamma value of 0.551. This finding indicates that experiential religiosity indeed has a statistically substantial impact on American's attitude regarding homosexuality.

American Attitudes on Abortion: The Impact of the Religiosity Dimensions

Bivariate analysis between American attitudes on abortion and the religiosity dimensions are found in Table 10. The exact variables used in the homosexuality attitudes and religiosity dimensions crosstabulations, were used to identify each of the five religiosity dimensions: the *intellectual, ritualistic, ideological, consequential,* and *experiential.* Respondents were asked to assess whether abortion is right or wrong – as measured by an abortion index comprised of 7 items with possible answers ranging from most pro-choice to least pro-choice.

Intellectual Religiosity

The variable Bible, which asks respondents to identify the Bible as the Word of God, Inspired Word of God, a book of faith, or some other type of book, was used to identify the intellectual dimension of religiosity. Bivariate analyses are recorded in Table 10.

As expected, respondents who strongly held pro-choice attitudes also believed that the Bible is simply a book of faith (67.5% of respondents). Of respondents who believe that the Bible is the Word of God, only 15.4% also held strong pro-choice attitudes. 30.7% of respondents who believed that the Bible is the Inspired Word of God also believed that abortion is right. Respondents who believed that the Bible is some type of book other than the Word of God, Inspired Word of God, or book of faith, held

the strongest, pro-life attitudes. Moreover, 23.5%, 7.6%, and 1.7% of respondents who believed that the Bible is the Word of God, Inspired Word of God or book of faith respectively, also-held least pro-choice attitudes (see Table 10).

Nevertheless, the strength of the relationship between intellectual religiosity and American attitudes about whether abortion should be allowed or not is substantial, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.269 (see Table 10).

Ritualistic Religiosity: Ritual

Ritual religiosity had an interesting impact on American attitudes about abortion. Results of bivariate analysis between *ritual* and American attitudes about abortion are recorded in Table 10.

Individuals who never attend church held the strongest, pro-choice attitudes when compared to other individuals who attend church on a more frequent basis. When analyzing the column on Table 10 which contains the most pro-choice attitudes, the percentage of individuals who hold strong pro-choice attitudes decreases as church attendance frequency increases. Thus, attitudes about abortion and ritual religiosity have a negative association (see Table 10).

Individuals who attend a church service more than once a week, interestingly, held the least pro-choice attitudes, with 42.1% of individuals who attend church more than once a week believing that abortion is wrong. Of individuals who never attend church, only 3.7% held least pro-choice attitudes. Nevertheless, as church attendance frequency increases (as noted in the column labeled 'least pro-choice'), the percentage of individuals who profess pro-life attitudes also increases (see Table 10).

Table 10:
Percentages and Significance of Independent Variables (Dimensions of Religiosity) on American Attitudes about Whether Abortion is Right or Wrong
(Abortion Index)

Independent Variable:	Most Pro-Choice	1	2	3	4	5	Least Pro-Choice	Total %	Freq.	Chi Sq. (DF)	Sig.	Cramer's V	Gamma	Missing INR
Bible (BIBLE): Intellectual Religiosity														
WoG	15.4	7.4	7.2	20.1	13.4	12.9	23.5	100.0	303	183.327	0.000	0.269	-	144
Ins. WoG	30.7	6.3	6.7	23.4	15.0	10.3	7.6	100.0	391	(18)				237
BoFaith	67.5	8.1	8.1	6.8	3.8	4.0	1.7	100.0	137					69
Other	39.8	0.0	0.0	6.0	0.0	6.0	48.2	100.0	15					13
Church Attendance (ATTEND): Ritualistic(Ritual) Religiosity														
Never	50.9	8.1	8.2	19.4	3.7	5.9	3.7	100.0	125	213.064	0.000	0.203	0.346	306
LTO YR	47.5	10.0	10.6	10.7	11.3	6.2	3.8	100.0	75	(54)				128
O Y R	43.6	6.6	6.6	27.6	6.7	4.0	5.0	100.0	120					279
ST YR	42.8	2.8	6.5	14.4	15.5	8.4	9.5	100.0	100					273
O MON	14.1	11.7	2.3	22.3	17.9	10.2	21.5	100.0	59					130
2-3X MON	28.0	9.9	3.8	18.3	8.0	15.0	16.9	100.0	74					194
NR E WK	21.6	5.9	11.9	21.6	15.3	8.3	15.5	100.0	63					105
E WK	15.0	6.1	7.8	19.3	22.0	17.0	12.8	100.0	166					361
MTO WKO	9.5	4.3	3.1	19.0	8.2	13.8	42.1	100.0	74					170
Pray (PRAY): Ritualistic (Devotion) Religiosity														
ST Day	17.1	6.2	3.5	20.5	13.4	12.0	27.4	100.0	269	149.684	0.000	0.187	0.362	147
O Day	25.8	8.5	9.2	21.9	14.3	11.1	9.2	100.0	227	(30)				140
ST WK	37.5	4.8	6.7	18.3	15.3	10.3	7.1	100.0	125					65
O WK	38.7	12.9	11.5	15.7	8.5	6.3	6.3	100.0	44					30
LTOWK	42.7	6.7	9.8	20.2	9.8	8.7	2.1	100.0	90					48
Never	61.7	6.1	7.0	13.6	4.7	5.1	2.3	100.0	100					37
Beliefs about God (GODCHNGE): Ideological Religiosity														
DBG, NH	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	4	22.796	0.199	0.137	-	2
DBG, UT	44.7	0.0	0.0	22.1	11.1	22.1	0.0	100.0	4	(18)				5
BGN, DUT	23.9	4.8	0.0	17.9	19.4	24.2	9.8	100.0	29					15
BGN, AH	23.9	6.9	3.9	20.1	13.6	11.0	20.7	100.0	368					199
Strength of Affiliation (RELITEN): Consequential Religiosity														
Strong	19.9	5.3	5.5	18.6	15.0	14.8	20.8	100.0	338	107.492	0.000	0.205	0.310	737
NV Strg.	35.9	8.7	8.4	23.1	10.9	7.1	6.0	100.0	321	(18)				707
SW Strg.	25.0	4.8	8.4	14.5	15.4	16.5	15.4	100.0	67					205
No Rel.	54.6	8.1	4.8	15.5	7.5	1.8	7.7	100.0	126					268
"Born Again" Experience(REBORN): Experiential Religiosity														
Yes	19.4	6.4	4.7	19.2	14.0	14.2	22.1	100.0	286	62.046	0.000	0.271	0.370	155
No	38.0	7.3	8.3	19.3	11.2	7.8	8.1	100.0	562	(6)				308

The relationship between American attitudes about abortion and the *ritual* category of religiosity is moderate, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.203 and Gamma value of 0.346 (see Table 10).

Ritualistic Religiosity: Devotion

As noted in the methods section, the variable PRAY was used to operationalize the ***devotion*** category of ritualistic religiosity. Bivariate results of ***devotion*** and American attitudes about abortion are recorded in Table 10.

Most interestingly is the finding that the strongest pro-choice attitudes came from individuals who never prayed. Specifically, **61.7%** of individuals who never engage in prayer held strong, pro-choice attitudes whereas only **2.3%** of individuals who never pray held strong pro-life views (see Table **10).**

27.4% of respondents that pray several times a day also strongly believed that abortion is absolutely wrong; whereas only **17.1%** held strong, pro-choice attitudes (see Table **10).**

The percentage of respondents who hold strong, pro-choice attitudes increases as individuals pray less with **17.1** of those who pray several times a day, **25.8%** of respondents who pray once a day, **37.8%** of respondents who pray several times a week, **38.7%** of respondents who pray once a week, and **42.7%** of respondents who pray less than once a week strongly believing that abortion is not wrong at all. Alternatively, as respondents increase their frequency of prayer, so does the percentage of individuals who hold least pro-choice attitudes (see Table **10).**

The relationship between ***devotion*** and American attitudes about abortion is moderate, as measured by a Cramer's V value of **0.187** and Gamma value of **0.362** (see Table **10).**

Ideological Religiosity

The variable GODCHNGE, which measures respondent's beliefs about God, was used to identify the ideological dimension of religiosity. Results of bivariate analysis between ideological religiosity and American attitudes about abortion are recorded in Table 10.

Among individuals who believe in God now and that have always believed in God, **23.9%** held strong, pro-choice attitudes. Of the same individuals only **20.7%** held strong, pro-life attitudes. Thus, there is little difference in the percentage of individuals professing support for either view among those individuals who believe in God now and always have. Interestingly, the stronger support for pro-choice derives from individuals who currently hold an atheist view or who don't believe in God now. Specifically, **100.0%** and **44.7%** of individuals who don't believe in God now and never have as well as individuals who don't believe in God now but used to, held strong, pro-choice attitudes. These statistics, however, are not reliable as there were only **4** and 9 cases, respectively, for each of these views. The largest frequency of cases was concentrated in the category "believe in God now and always have". Thus, most respondents believe in the existence of a supreme deity and that this influences attitudes about abortion (see Table **10).** The relationship between beliefs about God and attitudes about abortion is low, as measured by a Cramer's V value of **0.137** (see Table **10).**

Consequential Religiosity

The variable RELITEN, which measures a respondent's strength of affiliation to a religious institution, was used to identify the consequential dimension of religiosity.

Bivariate analysis of consequential religiosity and American attitudes about abortion are recorded in Table 10.

Individuals who were not religiously affiliated to any religious institution held the strongest, pro-choice attitudes when compared to individual with varying levels of commitment. For example, of respondents who held a somewhat strong affiliation, **25.0%** held strong pro-choice view whereas only **15.4%** of them held conservative views about abortion.

Respondents who self-professed a not very strong affiliation to a religious institution, were more likely than any other individuals to hold the least, pro-life views. Specifically, of respondents with a not very strong affiliation, **35.9%** strongly believed that abortion was not wrong, whereas only 6.0% of them held views which opposed abortion.

Of respondents who do have a strong affiliation to a religious institution in the U.S., only **19.9%** or the smallest percentage of all other respondents, hold strong pro-choice attitudes. Alternatively, **20.8%** of respondents with a strong affiliation held least pro-choice attitudes.

The strength of the relationship between strength of affiliation and American attitudes about abortion is moderate, as measured by a Cramer's V value of **0.205** and Gamma value of **0.310.** What this strong relationship suggests of course, is that varying strengths of affiliation held by respondents will significantly impact their perceived views regarding the morality of abortion. Individuals with strong affiliation are more likely than any respondents, to hold least pro-choice views.

Experiential Religiosity

To measure experiential religiosity, I used the variable REBORN, which measures whether or not respondents have encountered a "born-again" experience. Results of the bivariate analysis between experiential religiosity and attitudes about abortion are recorded in Table **10.**

As expected, individuals who are experientially religious at the dimension of not having had encountered a "born-again" experience, held the strongest pro-choice attitudes when compared to respondents who have had a "born-again". Specifically, **38.0%** of respondents who have not had a "born-again" experience believed that abortion was not wrong, whereas only **8.1%** of them held least pro-choice views. Alternatively, **19.4%** of who have had a "born-again" experience held least pro-choice attitudes, with only a small percentage higher **(22.1%)** of with "born-again" experienced holding least pro-choice views.

The relationship between experiential religiosity and American attitudes about abortion is substantial, as suggested by a Cramer's V value of **0.271** and Gamma value of **0.370.** Thus, having had a "born-again" experience significantly impacts respondent's view about abortion.

American *Attitudes on Immigration: The Impact of the Religiosity Dimensions*

American attitudes on whether immigrants have a negative impact on American society, as detailed in the methods section, were measured using a complex index that combined four different items. The impact of the religiosity dimensions on immigration attitudes had interesting results, as illustrated in Table 11. It is important to note that distinct variables were used for the ideological and experiential dimensions of religiosity

in the bivariate analysis between religiosity and attitudes about immigration because of variable limitations – when compared to religiosity variables used in homosexuality and abortion analyses. Recall as well that immigration analyses will reflect American attitudes during the year of **1994.**

Intellectual Religiosity

The variable BIBLE, which asks respondents' beliefs about the Bible, was used to measure the intellectual dimension of religiosity.

Of respondents who believe that the Bible is the Word of God, a large percentage also believes that immigrants have a negative impact on American society. Specifically, **79.2%** of respondents who believe that the Bible is the Word of God also agree with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society whereas only **20.8%** disagree. Thus, respondents who are religious at the intellectual dimension of religiosity, specifically those that believe the Bible to be the Word of God, are more likely to hold negative views about immigration.

Moreover, **75.9%** of respondents who believe that the Bible is the Inspired Word of God also agree with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society whereas only 24.0% disagree. Thus, respondents who are intellectually religious as measured by the belief that the Bible is the Inspired Word of God, are slightly more likely to disagree with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact in American society – registering more liberal views.

Table 11:
Percentages and Significance of Independent Variables (Dimensions of Religiosity) on American Attitudes about Whether Immigrants Have a Negative Impact on American Society (Immigration Index)

Independent Variable	Disagree	1	2	Agree	Total %	Freq.	Chi Sq. (DF)	Sig.	Cramer's V	Gamma	Missing / NR
Bible (BIBLE): Intellectual Religiosity											
WoG	3.1	17.7	53.8	25.4	100.0	260	28.100	0.001	0.107	-	356
Ins. WoG	4.0	20.0	62.6	13.3	100.0	420	(9)				582
BoFaith	7.8	24.8	55.0	12.4	100.0	129					163
Other	10.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	100.0	10					8
Church Attendance (ATTEND): Ritualistic (Ritual) Religiosity											
Never	5.8	21.3	61.4	11.6	100.0	207	26.743	0.478	0.083	0.083	274
LTO YR	2.9	17.3	59.6	20.2	100.0	104	(27)				122
O YR	2.6	20.5	56.8	20.0	100.0	190					226
ST YR	6.7	17.8	61.7	13.9	100.0	180					202
O MON	5.4	14.4	58.6	21.6	100.0	111					110
2-3X MON	2.8	25.9	50.9	20.4	100.0	108					166
NREWK	5.4	14.3	58.9	21.4	100.0	56					90
EWK	5.8	18.1	60.6	15.5	100.0	226					334
MTO WKO	4.5	21.6	53.4	20.5	100.0	88					147
Pray (PRAY): Ritualistic (Devotion) Religiosity											
ST Day	2.9	19.7	55.5	22.0	100.0	173	21.655	0.117	0.094	0.083	281
O Day	3.9	17.3	62.2	16.5	100.0	254	(15)				386
ST WK	7.9	23.8	52.5	15.8	100.0	101					125
O WK	2.5	22.5	58.8	16.3	100.0	80					87
LTO WK	4.4	20.5	59.0	16.1	100.0	205					235
Never	23.1	23.1	46.2	7.7	100.0	13					13
Relationship of Nature to God (NATURGOD)[12]: Ideological Religiosity											
NC by God	4.6	17.8	59.9	17.8	100.0	394	3.133	0.792	0.038	-	1092
NS Itself	5.0	22.5	54.3	18.2	100.0	258	(6)				608
NIBNS	4.8	20.0	58.9	16.4	100.0	421					862
Strength of Affiliation (RELITEN): Consequential Religiosity											
Strong	5.0	21.4	55.6	18.0	100.0	444	4.524	0.874	0.035	0.011	15636
NV Strong	4.6	18.3	59.9	17.3	100.0	526	(9)				16683
SW Strong	4.9	18.1	60.4	16.7	100.0	144					4235
No Rel.	6.7	22.5	56.7	14.2	100.0	120					4009
Confidence in the Existence of God (GOD)": Experiential Religiosity											
Don't Believe	12.5	18.8	46.9	21.9	100.0	32	18.898	0.218	0.074	-	171
NWFO	0.0	21.2	57.6	21.2	100.0	33	(15)				292
SHP	3.3	22.3	54.5	19.8	100.0	121					550
BS	6.0	32.0	52.0	10.0	100.0	50					281
BBD	6.5	21.1	56.8	15.7	100.0	185					1146
KGE	4.1	18.0	60.3	17.6	100.0	738					4428

[11] Results are reflective of the year 1994 rather than 2004 because immigration index is only available for 1994.
[12] This variable (NATUREGOD) is substitute for the variable GODCHNGE, which is not available for 1994.
[13] This variable (GOD) is substitute for the variable REBORN, which is not available for 1994.

Interestingly, respondents who believe that the Bible is simply a Book of Faith also held the second most favorable attitudes indicating that immigrants do not have a negative impact on American society. Nevertheless, **67.4%** of respondents who believe that the Bible is simply a Book of Faith also strongly believed that immigrants indeed have a negative impact on American society.

The relationship between intellectual religiosity and attitudes about immigration is low, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.0107. Thus, American's attitudes regarding immigration are affected very little by the intellectual dimension of religiosity. That is, there are other variables which have greater impact. Implications of this finding will be discussed in the following chapter.

Ritualistic Religiosity: Ritual

In order to measure the ritual category of ritualistic religiosity, a variable which measures church attendance was used. Results were quite intriguing (see Table 11). Regardless of frequency of church attendance, a majority of respondents expressed negative attitudes regarding immigration to the United States. Specifically, **73.0** of those who never attend church, **79.8%** of respondents who attend church less than once a year, **76.8%** of respondents who attend church once a year, **75.6%** of those who attend church several times a year, **80.2%** of respondents who attend church once a month, **71.3%** of American who attend **2-3** times a month, **80.3%** of respondents who attend church nearly every week, **76.1%** of respondents who attend church every week, and **73.9%** of respondents who attend services more than once a week, agreed with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society. Alternatively, only **27.1%** of

respondents who never attend church and **26.1%** of respondents who attend church more than once a week held positive attitudes regarding immigration.

The strength of the relationship between ***ritual*** and American attitudes about immigration is negligible, as measured by a Cramer's V value of **0.083** and Gamma value of **0.083.** This finding suggests that there are other variables that have a greater impact on respondents' attitudes about immigration.

Ritualistic Religiosity: Devotion

To measure the ***devotion*** category of ritualistic religiosity, a variable which measures a respondent's frequency of prayer was used. Results of bivariate analyses between ***devotion*** and American attitudes about immigration are included in Table **11.**

As with bivariate results for intellectual and ***ritual*** religiosity, a majority of respondents expressed negative attitudes about immigration regardless of frequency of prayer. Specifically, **77.5%** of respondents who pray several times a day, **78.7%** of respondents who pray once a day, **68.3%** of respondents who pray several times a week, **75.1%** of respondents who pray once a week, **75.1%** of respondents who pray less than once a week, and **53.9%** of respondents who never pray, also agreed with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society.

Interestingly, respondents who never engage in prayer were more likely than any other American, to hold positive attitudes about immigration. Specifically, **46.2%** of respondents who never pray believed immigrants have a positive impact on American society. Alternatively, respondents who engage in prayer several times a day were less likely to express positive attitudes about immigration **(22.6%).** The strength of the

relationship between devotion and American attitudes regarding immigration is negligible, as measured by a Cramer's V value of **0.094** and Gamma value of **0.083.**

Ideological Religiosity

As previously noted, a distinct variable from the one used in the homosexuality and abortion crosstabulations, was used to measure the ideological dimension of religiosity. Thus the variable used was NATURGOD, which asks for respondents to identify the relationship between nature and God. Results are included in Table 11.

Similar to other measures of religiosity, a majority of respondents believed that immigrants have a negative impact on American society. Specifically, **77.7%** of respondents who believe that nature was created by God, **72.5%** of respondents who believe that nature is sacred in itself, and **75.3%** of respondents who believe that nature is important but not sacred, conjunctly believed that immigrants do have a negative impact on our society. Alternatively, **22.4%** of respondents who believe that nature was created by God, **27.5%** of respondents who believe that nature is sacred in itself, and **24.8%** of respondents who believe that nature is important but not sacred, disagreed with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on our society. In sum, individuals who are ideologically religious, as measured by believing that nature was created by God were more likely than other respondents to also agree with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society. The strength of the relationship between ideological religiosity and American attitude about immigration is negligible, as measured by a Cramer's V value of **0.038.**

Consequential Religiosity

To measure the consequential dimension of religiosity, the variable **RELITEN**, which measured American's strength of affiliation to a religious institution, was used. Crosstabulations of the percentages and significance of consequential religiosity on American attitudes about whether immigrants have a negative impact on American society are included in Table 11.

As expected, a majority of respondents professed a negative attitude regarding immigration despite varying strengths of religious affiliation. Specifically, 73.6% of respondents with a strong affiliation, 77.2% of respondents with a not very strong affiliation, 77.1% of respondents with a somewhat strong affiliation, and 70.2% of respondents with no religious affiliation, believed that immigrants cause a negative impact on our society. Although not statistically significant, individuals with stronger religious affiliation held stronger, negative attitudes regarding immigration.

Alternatively, only 26.4% of respondents with a strong affiliation, 22.9% of respondents with a not very strong affiliation, 23.0 % of respondents with a somewhat strong affiliation, and 29.2% of respondents without a religious affiliation, disagreed with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society. The strength of the relationship between consequential religiosity and American attitudes about immigration is negligible, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.035 and Gamma value of 0.011.

Experiential Religiosity

As previously noted, a different variable from the one used in the homosexuality and abortion crosstabulations, was used to measure the experiential dimension of religiosity – because the original variable was not available in 1996. Thus the variable

used was GOD, which measures a respondent's confidence in the existence of God. Results are included in Table 11.

Despite the varying levels of confidence in the existence of God, a majority of respondents believed that immigrants have a negative impact on American society. For example, of respondents that don't believe in the existence of God, 68.8% also believed that immigrants have a negative impact on our society. At the other end of the spectrum, those with confidence in the existence of God, 77.9% also held negative attitudes about immigrants – a substantially larger percentage when compared to respondents that don't know believe in the existence of God. Thus it's evident that individuals, who are experientially religious, are more likely to express negative attitudes regarding immigration. The strength of the relationship between experiential religiosity and American attitudes about immigration is negligible, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.074. This suggests that American attitudes about immigration are little affected by varying degrees of experiential religiosity.

American Attitudes on Family Values: The Impact of the Religiosity Dimensions

To measure American attitudes about family values, an index combining five different items was used. This index measured American attitudes about whether people benefit from a traditional family composition. Because of variable limitations, the variable make up of this index and the independent variables used for crosstabulation analysis, will reflect American attitudes during the year of 1996 rather than 2004. Recall as well that a different variable was used to identify the ideological dimension of religiosity. The variable GODCHNGE, which was not available for the year 1996, was replaced with the variable POSTLIFE, which measures respondents' belief in the

existence in a life after death. In addition, no analysis was conducted between experiential religiosity and American attitudes regarding family, since no variable was available in 1996 that would clearly conceptualize the experiential dimension of religiosity.

Intellectual Religiosity

To identify the intellectual dimension, the variable which asks respondents to identify their beliefs about the Bible was used. Percentages and significance of the intellectual dimension on American attitudes about immigration are recorded in Table 8.

Of respondents who believe that the Bible is the Word of God, 21.6% agree with the idea that people benefit from a traditional family composition. This percentage reflects the strongest attitude when compared to respondents who believe the Bible to be the Inspired Word of God or simply a book of faith. Additionally, 19.9% of respondents who believe that the Bible is the Inspired Word of God, also strongly believe that people benefit from a traditional family composition whereas only 14.1% hold opposing views. Of respondents who believe that the Bible is a book of faith, 12.7% also believe in traditional attitudes regarding family values whereas 15.5% (a larger percentage) hold opposing views. It is interesting however, that a majority of respondents' attitudes (31.8%, 20.6%, 25.5%, and 50.0%) regarding family values, regardless of the intensity of intellectual religiosity, were neutral rather than traditional or non-traditional.

These findings are interesting; however the relationship between intellectual religiosity and American attitudes about family values is moderate, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.117. Thus, varying dimensions of intellectual religiosity have somewhat of an impact on respondents' attitudes regarding family values.

Ritualistic Religiosity: Ritual

The ***ritual*** category of ritualistic religiosity was identified using a variable which measures the fiequency of a respondent's church attendance, ranging fiom never attending service to attending more than once a week. Percentages and significance of ***ritual*** religiosity on American attitudes about whether people benefit fiom a traditional family composition are recorded in Table 12.

Overall, as the percentage of respondents who agree with the idea that people benefit fiom a traditional family composition increases, so does the fiequency of church attendance. For example, of respondents who never attend church service, **17.5%** held traditional views about family values. On the other hand, respondents who attend church service more than once a week, held a stronger, traditional attitudes about family values as evidenced by **35.6%** strongly agreeing with the idea that people benefit fiom a traditional family composition, with only 5.5% strongly disagreeing. The strength of the relationship between ***ritual*** and American attitudes about family values is low, as measured by a Cramer's V value of **0.136** and Gamma value of 0.125. What this suggests is that ***ritual*** is a poor predictor of respondents' attitudes about family values. A more precise strength between the two variables will be indicated in the **OLS** regression analysis.

Ritualistic Religiosity: Devotion

As noted in the methods section, the variable used to identify the ***devotion*** category of religiosity was PRAY, which measures the frequency of respondents' engagement in prayer. The percentages and significance of ***devotion*** on American

Table 12:
Percentages and Significance of Independent Variables (Dimensions of Religiosity) on American Attitudes about Whether People Benefit from Traditional Family Composition (Family Values Index)[14]

Independent Variable	Disagree 1	2	3	Agree	Total	Freq.	Chi Sq. (DF)	Sig.	Cramer's V	Gamma	Missing / NR
Bible (BIBLE): Intellectual Dimension											
WoG	7.4	21.6	31.8	17.6	21.6	100.0	176	23.785	0.022	0.117	-	6277
Ins. WoG	14.1	26.8	20.6	18.6	19.9	100.0	291	(12)				9305
BoFaith	15.5	35.5	25.5	10.9	12.7	100.0	110					2921
Other	0.0	25.0	50.0	25.0	0.0	100.0	4					192
Church Attendance (ATTEND): Ritualistic Dimension (Ritual)												
Never	19.0	21.2	25.5	16.8	17.5	100.0	137	65.316	0.002	0.136	0.125	6872
LTO YR	9.9	32.4	23.9	14.1	19.5	100.0	71	(36)				3599
O YR	12.7	32.2	22.9	18.6	13.6	100.0	118					5990
ST YR	11.2	23.2	29.6	10.4	25.6	100.0	125					5951
O MON	12.3	27.7	15.4	20.0	24.6	100.0	65					3256
2-3X MON	7.2	28.9	22.9	21.7	19.3	100.0	83					4032
NR E WK	18.8	22.9	33.3	6.3	18.8	100.0	48					2617
EWK	6.1	25.7	25.0	22.3	20.9	100.0	148					9307
MTO WKO	5.5	6.8	27.4	24.7	35.6	100.0	73					3513
Pray (PRAY): Ritualistic Dimension (Devotion)												
ST DAY	9.4	22.5	25.6	20.6	21.9	100.0	160	20.754	0.412	0.093	0.101	4769
O DAY	12.6	26.7	26.2	14.7	19.9	100.0	191	(20)				5626
ST WK	9.9	26.8	28.2	16.9	18.3	100.0	71					2515
O WK	6.3	20.8	20.8	20.8	31.3	100.0	48					1417
LTOWK	17.4	33.9	22.0	14.7	11.9	100.0	109					3887
Never	18.8	33.9	25.0	12.5	18.8	100.0	16					351
Belief in Life after Death (POSTLIFE) : Ideological Dimension[15]												
Yes	11.4	27.7	25.9	15.9	19.1	100.0	440	2.262	0.688	0.065	0.022	989
No	13.7	25.5	20.6	19.6	20.6	100.0	102	(4)				206
Strength of Affiliation (RELITEN): Consequential Dimension												
Strong	9.9	20.5	27.6	19.6	22.4	100.0	312	24.072	0.020	0.097	0.081	15768
NV Strong	10.7	29.6	24.0	14.7	21.1	100.0	375	(12)				16834
SW Strong	7.7	23.1	23.1	26.9	19.2	100.0	78					4301
No Rel.	20.9	22.0	25.3	14.3	17.6	100.0	91					4038
Experential Dimension: No variable available.												

attitudes about whether people benefit from a traditional family composition are recorded on Table 12.

The strongest, non-traditional attitudes about family values was perceived by respondents who never engage in prayer (18.8%), followed by respondents who engage in prayer less than once a week (17.4%). Alternatively, the strongest, traditional attitudes

[14] Results are only reflective of the year 1996 rather than 2004 due to variable constraints.
[15] This variable is a substitute for GODCHNGE, which is not available for 1996.

about family values was perceived by respondents who engage in prayer once a week, or 31.3%. Of respondents who engage in prayer several times a day, on the other hand, 21.9% strongly agreed with the idea that people benefit fiom a traditional family composition whereas only 9.4% opposed that belief.

The strength of the relationship between devotion and American attitudes about family values is negligible, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.093 and Gamma value of 0.101.

Ideological Religiosity

To measure the ideological dimension of religiosity, a variable that measures respondents' belief in life after death was used. Percentages and significance of ideological religiosity on American attitudes about family values are recorded in Table 8.

Of respondents who believe in life after death, 19.1% also believed that people indeed benefit fiom a traditional family composition, whereas only 11.4% held an opposing view. Respondents who don't believe in life after death on the other hand, held stronger, positive attitudes about family values whereas only 13.7% disagreed with the idea that people benefit fiom a traditional family composition. A majority of respondents however, held neutral attitudes about family values, as evidenced by a large percentage in the middle range of the scale fiom 1 to 5 testing to what extent people believe society benefits from a traditional family composition. The strength of the relationship between believing in life after death and American attitudes about family values is low, as measured by a Cramer's V value of 0.065 and Gamma value of 0.022.

Consequential Religiosity

To measure the consequential dimension of religiosity, the variable RELITEN, which measured strength of affiliation to a religious institution, was used: Percentages and significance of consequential religiosity on American attitudes about family values are included in Table 8.

Interestingly, among respondents who professed a strong religious affiliation, 22.4% strongly expressed traditional attitudes about family values, whereas only 9.9% disagreed with the idea that people benefit from a traditional family composition. Of respondents who expressed having a not very strong religious affiliation, 21.1% held strong, traditional attitudes about family values whereas only 10.7% held alternative views. Moreover, of respondents who held a somewhat strong affiliation to a religious institution, 19.2% also held strong, traditional attitudes about family values whereas only 7.7% disagreed with the idea that people benefit fiom a traditional family composition. Lastly, of respondents who held no religious affiliation in 1996, 17.6% strongly agreed with the idea that people benefit from a traditional family composition whereas a larger percentage, 20.9%, disagreed.

From analyzing the data, the percentage of respondents who express traditional attitudes about family values actually increases, as the strength of affiliation also increases – with respondents who held a strong affiliation also having the strongest, traditional attitudes about family values. Alternatively, as the percentage of respondents who hold non-traditional attitudes about family values increases, the strength of affiliation decreases – with respondents who held no religious affiliation in 1994 holding the strongest, non-traditional attitudes about family values. The strength of the

relationship between strength of religious affiliation and American attitudes is negligible, as measured by a Cramer's V value of **0.097** and Gamma value of 0.081.

OLS Regression Model of Independent Variables on American Attitudes about Homosexuality

While the bivariate analysis provided interesting findings regarding American attitudes about homosexuality, the OLS regression model provided more precise, statistical results for the impact of independent variables on American attitudes about homosexuality because all independent variables are controlled simultaneously. In this OLS regression model, I arranged the independent variables, which included the variables identifying each specific religiosity dimension and the demographic variables, from variables of perceived, greater impact to the variables of perceived, lesser impact. Regression results indicate that **31.7%** of the variance in attitudes about homosexuality is explained by the selected independent/demographic variables. OLS regression model results are recorded in Table **13.** Specific regression findings for the various independent/demographic variables are detailed in the following sections.

Intellectual Religiosity

Beginning with the variable that identifies the intellectual dimension of religiosity, BIBLE, a negative slope of **-0.450** suggests that respondents, who believe that the Bible is the Word of God, are significantly, more likely to express homophobic views. A Beta value of **0.172** suggests that after controlling for the other variables, respondents' belief that the Bible is the Word of God has the second strongest impact on attitudes about homosexuality (see Table 13).

Ritualistic Religiosity

A positive slope .of 0.659 indicates that the fewer respondents go to Church, the more accepting their views regarding homosexuality. This finding reinforces the results found in the crosstabulation between these two variables. After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.126 indicates that church attendance has a relatively strong relationship to attitudes about homosexuality (see Table 13).

A negative slope of -0.351 between respondents who go to Church more than once a week and attitudes about homosexuality suggests that individuals who attend church frequently are more likely to hold homophobic views. After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.097 suggests a weak association between this variable and attitudes about homosexual behavior (see Table 13).

OLS regression results indicate that regardless of frequency of prayer, respondents believe sexual relations between same-sex consenting adults are wrong. For example, between respondents who never pray and attitudes about homosexual behavior, a negative slope of -0.045 indicates that the less a respondent prays, the more likely the respondent is to exhibit homophobic views. The same result holds for respondents who engage in prayer several times a day. A negative slope of -0.074 indicates that as the frequency of prayer increases, the more likely respondents will exhibit homophobic views. Thus, regardless of frequency of prayer, respondents will register opposition to homosexual behavior. After controlling for the other variables, Beta values of 0.006 and 0.028 respectively, indicate that the relationship between less or more frequency of prayer and attitudes about homosexuality is weak. (see Table 13)

Table 13:
OLS Regression Model of Independent Variables on American Attitudes about Homosexuality

	-Slope	Beta	S.E.	t
RELIGIOSITY				
Intellectual Religiosity				
Word of God	-0.450	0.172	0.148	**-3.045****
Ritualistic(Ritual) Religiosity				
Never go to Church	0.659	0.126	0.297	2.221
Go more than once a **week** to Church	-0.351	0.097	0.188	-1.861
Ritualistic (Devotion) Religiosity				
Never pray	-0.045	0.006	0.449	**-0.100**
Pray several times a day	-0.074	0.028	0.140	-0.529
Ideological Religiosity				
Believe in God now & always have	-0.557	0.122	0.231	**-2.414***
Don't believe in God & never have	0.805	0.067	0.623	1.293
Consequential Religiosity				
Strong affiliation	-0.464	0.178	0.143	**-3.240****
Experiential Religiosity				
Have not had a "Born again" experience	0.450	0.162	0 151	**2.986****
RELIGION				
Protestant	-0.194	0.072	0.215	-0.904
Catholic	-0.236	0.071	0.252	-0.938
Jew	0.872	0.058	0.724	1.204
None	-0.570	0.124	0.307	-1.860
SEX				
Female	0.254	0.097	0.124	**2.050***
RACE & ETHNICITY				
White	0.203	0.073	0.193	1.052
Black	0.095	0.025	0.244	0.390
Hispanic	0.073	0.014	0.289	0.254
YEARS OF EDUCATION				
Education	0.070	0.147	0.024	**2.894****
FAMILY INCOME				
Income of Previous Year (in dollars)	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.084
REGION OF THE U.S.				
West South Central	-0.004	0.001	0.207	-0.019
RURAL				
Rural	-0.161	0.062	0.122	-1.322

F= 7.425; p= 0.000
R-Square=0.317

Ideological Religiosity

Regression results between ideological religiosity and American attitudes about homosexuality yield a slope value of -0.557 suggests that respondents who believe in God now and always have are *significantly* more likely to hold homophobic views. A

Beta value of 0.122 suggests that the relative strength between believing in God now and always have and attitude about homosexuality is strong (see Table 13).

Respondents who don't believe in God now and never have are more likely to hold liberal attitudes about homosexuality – as measured by a slope value of 0.805. However, a Beta value of 0.067 suggests that the relative strength between not believing in God now and never have and attitudes about homosexuality is weak (see Table 13).

Consequential Religiosity

Respondents who hold a strong affiliation with their respective religious institution were significantly more likely to hold homophobic views (b = -0.464). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.178 indicates that having a strong religious affiliation has the strongest impact on attitudes about homosexuality (see Table 13).

Experiential Religiosity

Respondents who have not had a "born-again" experience are significantly, more likely to hold conservative attitudes about homosexuality (b = 0.450). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.162 suggests that the relative strength between not having a "born-again" experience and attitudes about homosexuality has the third strongest impact on attitudes about homosexuality (see Table 13).

Demographic Variables

Across religious affiliation, being Protestant, Catholic, or expressing no religious affiliation was associated with more homophobic views (b = -0.194; b = -0.236; b = -0.570). A Beta value of 0.072 for Protestants suggests that the relative strength between being Protestant and attitudes about homosexuality is weak (see Table 13). A Beta value

of 0.071 for Catholics indicates that the relative strength between being Catholic and attitudes about homosexuality is also weak (see Table 13). A Beta value of 0.124 suggests that the relative strength between having no religious affiliation and attitudes about homosexuality is strong (see Table 13). Interestingly, being Jewish is associated with more liberal views regarding homosexuality (b = 0.872). After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength between being Jewish and attitudes regarding homosexuality is weak (Beta = 0.058) (see Table 13). While interesting, none of the measures of religious affiliation are significantly related to attitudes about homosexual behavior.

Females were significantly, more likely than men to hold liberal views about homosexuality (b = 0.354). A Beta value of 0.097 however, suggests that relative strength between sex of respondent and attitudes about homosexuality is weak (see Table 13).

None of the race/ethnic measures included in the OLS regression model was significantly associated with attitudes about homosexuality. White respondents were more likely to hold liberal views about homosexual behavior (b = 0.203). However, a Beta value of 0.073 suggests that the relative strength between being white and attitudes about homosexuality is very weak. Similarly, black respondents were more likely to hold liberal views about homosexuality (b = 0.095). A Beta value of 0.025 suggests that the relative strength of the relationship is low. Hispanics were also more likely to hold liberal views regarding homosexual behavior (b = 0.093). The relative strength of the relationship is negligible (Beta = 0.014). Of course, these results are all compared to the reference group (Asian and Native respondents). (see Table 13)

Years of education had a significant impact on American attitudes about homosexuality. A slope value of 0.070 suggests that for every year of education increase in years of education completed, tolerance for homosexual behavior increases. That is, the more education an American has acquired, the more liberal her/his views regarding homosexuality. A Beta value of 0.147 indicates the 4'' strongest impact on attitudes about homosexuality. Whereas the strength between education and homosexuality ideology is strong, the relative strength between income level and attitudes about homosexuality is low and not significant (Beta = 0.004). (see Table 13)

Respondents who reside in the West South Central region of the U.S. are slightly more likely to hold conservative views regarding homosexuality (b = 0.004). After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the relationship between residing in the West South Central and attitudes about homosexuality is negligible (Beta = 0.001). In addition, respondents who reside in a rural area of the United States were more likely to hold homophobic views (b = -0.161). The Beta value of 0.062 suggests that the relative strength of the relationship is low (see Table 13).

OLS Regression Model of Independent Variables on American Attitudes about Abortion

While the bivariate analysis provided interesting statistical results for American attitudes about abortion, the OLS regression model provided more precise, statistical findings for the impact of the independent variables on American attitudes about abortion because all independent variables are controlled simultaneously. In this OLS regression model, I arranged the independent variables, which included the variables identifying each specific religiosity dimension and the demographic variables, from variables of

perceived, greater impact to the variables of perceived, lesser impact. Regression results indicate that 25.8% of the variance in attitudes about abortion is explained by the selected independent/demographic variables. OLS regression model results are recorded in Table 14. Specific regression findings for the various independent/demographic variables are detailed in the following sections.

Intellectual Religiosity

Respondents who believe that the Bible is the Word of God are significantly, more likely to hold the least pro-choice attitudes, as measured by a positive slope of 0.679. These findings reinforce crosstabulation results between intellectual religiosity and attitudes about abortion that are recorded in Table 10. After controlling for other variables, a Beta value of 0.154 suggests that respondents who believe that the Bible is the Word of God has the third strongest impact on attitudes about abortion (see Table 14).

Ritualistic Religiosity

OLS regression results indicate that regardless of Church attendance frequency, respondents are likely to register opposition to any form of abortion. For example, a positive slope of 0.212 indicates that the fewer respondents attend Church service the more likely they will register opposition to abortion. After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.024 indicates that the relative strength of the relationship between respondents who never go to Church and attitudes about abortion is low (see Table 14). The same results hold true for respondents who attend church more than once a week. Respondents who go to church service more than once a week are also more likely to hold the least pro-choice attitudes - as measured by a positive slope of 0.564. A .Beta value of 0.092 indicates that the relative strength of the relationship between

Table 14:
OLS Regression Model of Independent Variables on American Attitudes about Abortion

	Slope	Beta.	S.E.	t
RELIGIOSITY				
Intellectual Religiosity				
Word of God	0.679	0.154	0.263	2.585*
Ritualistic (Ritual) Religiosity				
Never go to Church	0.212	0.024	0.524	0.404
Go more than once a week to Church	0.564	0.092	0.336	1.678
Ritualistic (Devotion) Religiosity				
Never pray	-0.649	0.051	0.752	-0.863
h a y several times a day	1.052	0.237	0.248	4.233**
Ideological Religiosity				
Believe in God now & always have	0.083	0.011	0.407	0.204
Don't believe in God & never have	-2.067	0.101	1.090	-1.896
Consequential Religiosity				
Strong affiliation	0.540	0.122	0.252	2.139*
Experiential Religiosity				
Have not had a "Born again" experience	-0.575	0.123	0.264	-2.177*
RELIGION				
Protestant	-0.161	0.035	0.393	-0.410
Catholic	0.417	0.074	0.458	0.910
Jew	-2.821	0.112	1.283	-2.199*
None	0.708	0.093	0.546	1.298
SEX				
Female	-0.459	0.103	0.219	-2.095*
RACE & ETHNICITY				
White	0.194	0.041	0.340	0.572
Black	-1.026	0.156	0.433	-2.372*
Hispanic	0.380	0.042	0.530	0.717
YEARS OF **EDUCATION**				
Education	-0.022	0.028	0.043	-0.522
FAMILY INCOME				
Income of Previous Year (in dollars)	0.000	0.057	0.000	-1.099
REGION OF THE U.S.				
West South Central	0.281	0.039	0.366	0.768
RURAL				
Rural	0.412	0.093	0.215	1.915

F=5.537; p= 0.000
R-Square=0.258

respondents who attend Church service more than once a week and attitudes about abortion is low (see Table 14).

On the devotion category of ritualistic religiosity, respondents who never pray are more likely to register the most pro-choice attitudes, as measured by a negative slope of -0.649. After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.051 indicates that the

relative strength of the relationship between respondents who never engage in prayer and attitudes about abortion is quite low (see Table 14).

Alternatively, a positive slope of 1.052 indicates that respondents who engage in prayer several times a day are significantly, more likely to strongly oppose any form of abortion. **A** Beta value of 0.237 indicates that the relative strength of the relationship between respondents who frequently engage in prayer and attitudes about abortion has the strongest impact on attitudes about abortion (see Table 14).

Ideological Religiosity

A positive slope of 0.083 indicates that respondents who believe in God now and always have are more likely to hold the least pro-choice attitudes. After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.011 indicates that the relative strength of the relationship between respondents who believe in God now and always have and attitudes about abortion is low.

Alternatively, a negative slope of -2.067 indicates that respondents who don't believe in God now and never have are most likely to hold the most pro-choice attitudes. After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.101 indicates that the relative strength of the relationship between respondents who don't believe in God now and never have and attitudes about abortion is somewhat strong (See Table 14)

Consequential Religiosity

A positive slope of 0.540 indicates that respondents who hold a strong affiliation to their religious institution/faith are significantly, most likely to hold the least pro-choice attitudes. After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.122 indicates that the

relative strength of the relationship between respondents who have a strong religious affiliation and American attitudes about abortion is somewhat strong. (See Table 14)

Experiential Religiosity

A negative slope of -0.575 indicates that respondents who have **not** had a "born again" experience are most likely to express strong, pro-choice attitudes. After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.123 indicates that the relative strength between experiential religiosity and attitudes about abortion is statistically significant and somewhat strong. (See Table 14)

Demographic Variables

Across religious affiliation, being Protestant was associated with most pro-choice attitudes (b = -0.161). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.035 indicates that the relative strength of between being Protestant and attitudes about abortion is weak. (See Table 14)

As expected, being Catholic was associated with least pro-choice attitudes (b = 0.417). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.074 indicates that the relative strength between being Catholic and attitudes about abortion is weak. (see Table 14)

Being Jewish was significantly associated with most pro-choice attitudes (b = - 2.821). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.112 indicates that the relative strength of the relationship between being of Jewish faith and attitudes about abortion is somewhat strong and statistically significant. (See Table 14)

Like respondents who were Catholic, respondents who ***did not*** hold any religious affiliation are most likely to register the least pro-choice attitudes (b = 0.708). After

controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.093 indicates that the relative strength of the relationship between respondents who are not religiously affiliated and attitudes about abortion is weak. (See Table 14.)

Females were significantly, more likely than men to hold liberal views about abortion (b = -0.459). The relative strength of the relationship between sex of respondent and attitudes about abortion is somewhat strong (Beta = 0.103). (See Table 14)

Of the race/ethnic measures included in the OLS regression model, only blacks were significantly associated with attitudes about abortion. Specifically, black respondents were significantly, more likely to register strong pro-choice attitudes (b = -1.026). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.156 indicates that being Black has the strongest impact on attitudes about abortion.

Although not statistically significant, white respondents are most likely to register least pro-choice attitudes (b = 0.194). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.041 indicates that the relative strength of being white and attitudes about abortion is low. (See Table 14)

Although not statistically significant, respondents of Hispanic origin are most likely to register least pro-choice attitudes about abortion (b = 0.380). The relative strength of the relationship between being Hispanic and attitudes about abortion is low (Beta = 0.042). (See Table 14)

Years of education did not have a significant impact on attitudes about abortion. However, a negative slope of 0.022 indicates that for every increase in years of education completed, tolerance of abortion increases. That is, the more educated a respondent, the more likely their attitudes about abortion are pro-choice. After controlling for the other

variables, a Beta value of **0.028** indicates that the relative strength of the relationship between years of education and attitudes about abortion is weak. Additionally, income level also has a weak and non-significant association with attitudes about abortion (Beta = **0.057).** (See Table **14)**

Although not statistically significant, regression results indicate that respondents who reside in the West South Central region of the U.S. are most likely to register least pro-choice attitudes (b = **0.281).** After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of **0.039** indicates that the relative strength of the relationship between respondents who reside in the West South Central region and attitudes about abortion is low. Additionally, respondents who reside in rural areas are also most likely to register least pro-choice attitudes (b = **0.412).** The relative strength of the relationship is weak and not statistically significant (Beta = **0.093).** (See Table **14)**

OLS Regression Model of Independent Variables on American Attitudes about Immigration

While the bivariate analysis provided interesting statistical results for American attitudes about whether immigrants have a negative impact on American society, the OLS regression model provided more precise, statistical findings for the impact of the independent variables on American attitudes about immigration because all independent variables are controlled simultaneously. In this OLS regression model, I again, arranged the independent variables, which included the variables identifying each specific religiosity dimension and the demographic variables, from variables of perceived, greater impact to the variables of perceived, lesser impact. Recall as well that the regression results reflect American attitudes during the year of **1994** rather than **2004.** Regression

results indicate that **8.4%** of the variance in attitudes about immigration is explained by the selected independent/demographic variables. OLS regression model results on attitudes about immigration are recorded in Table **15.** Specific regression findings for the various independent/demographic variables are detailed in the following sections.

Intellectual Religwsity

Respondents who believe that the Bible is the Word of God are most likely to agree with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society (b = **0.132).** After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the relationship is weak (Beta = **0.081).** (See Table **15)**

Ritualistic Religiosity

Although not statistically significant, OLS regression results indicate that regardless of frequency of Church attendance, respondents are most likely to register liberal views about immigration. For example, respondents who never go to Church are most likely to disagree with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society (b = **-0.0470).** After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of **0.021** indicates that the relative strength of the relationship between ritual and attitudes about immigration is weak. Alternatively, respondents who attend Church service more than once a week, are also likely to register opposition to the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society (b = **-0.116).** The relative strength of the association after controlling for other variables is weak (Beta = **0.039).**

Respondents who never engage in prayer are most likely to register opposition to the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society (b = **-0.074).**

Table 15:
OLS Regression Model of Independent Variables on American Attitudes about Immigration[16]

	Slope	Beta	S.E.	t
RELIGIOSITY				
Intellectual Religiosity				
Word of God	0.132	0.081	0.079	1.676
Ritualistic (Ritual) Religiosity				
Never go to Church	-0.047	0.021	0.105	-0.445
Go more than once a week to Church	-0.116	0.039	0.129	-0.895
Ritualistic (Devotion) Religiosity				
Never pray	-0.074	0.011	0.296	-0.248
Pray several times a day	0.025	0.014	0.083	0.298
Ideological Religiosity				
Nature created by God	-0.086	0.055	0.077	-1.104
Nature sacred in itself	0.095	0.055	0.080	1.185
Consequential Religiosity				
Strong affiliation	-0.111	0.072	0.074	-1.497
Experiential Religiosity				
Don't believe God exists	0.109	0.026	0.188	0.577
Know God exists	0.057	0.037	0.077	0.740
RELIGION				
Protestant	0.406	0.266	0.182	2.229*
Catholic	0.368	0.216	0.188	1.962
Jew	0.012	0.003	0.256	0.048
None	0.344	0.134	0.211	1.631
SEX				
Female	0.061	0.040	0.064	0.953
RACE & ETHNICITY				
White	-0.195	0.109	0.136	-1.434
Black	0.057	0.025	0.158	0.360
Hispanic	-0.182	0.050	0.198	-0.918
YEARS OF EDUCATION				
Education	-0.044	0.164	0.013	-3.463**
FAMILY INCOME				
income of Previous Year (in dollars)	0.000	0.047	0.000	1.051
REGION OF THE U.S.				
West South Central	0.052	0.021	0.104	0.505
RURAL				
Rural	0.011	0.007	0.064	0.174

F= 2.346; p= 0.001
R-Square=0.084

After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.011 indicates that the relationship weak and not statistically significant. On the alternative, respondents who do engage in daily, frequent prayer are most likely to agree with the idea that immigrants

[16] OLS Regression Analysis reflects the year 1994 instead of 2004 due to variable constraints.

have a negative impact on American society (b = 0.025). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.014 indicates that the relative strength of the relationship between respondents who engage in daily, frequent prayer and attitudes about immigration is weak. (see Table 15)

Ideological Religiosity

Respondents who believe that nature was created by God are most likely to register opposition to the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society (b = -0.086). The relative strength of the relationship between ideological religiosity and attitudes about immigration is weak and not statistically significant (Beta = 0.055). Alternatively, respondents who belief that nature is sacred in itself are most likely to agree with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society (b = 0.095). The relative strength of the association is weak and not statistically significant (Beta = 0.055). (see Table 15)

Consequential Religiosity

Although not statistically significant, respondents with a strong religious affiliation are most likely to disagree with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society (b = -0.111). The relative strength of the relationship is weak (Beta = 0.072). (see Table 15)

Experiential Religiosity

Regardless of whether respondents believed that God existed or not, respondents registered conservative views about immigration (b = 0.109; b = 0.057). The relative strength of both relationships is weak (Beta = 0.026; Beta = 0.037). (see Table 15)

Demographic Variables

Across religious affiliations, being Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or not religiously associated was associated with conservative views about immigration (b = 0.406; b = 0.368; b = 0.012; b = 0.344, respectively). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.266 indicates that being Protestant has significantly, the strongest impact on attitudes about immigration. After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.216 indicates that being Catholic has the second strongest impact on attitudes about immigration. A Beta value of 0.003 indicates that the association between being Jewish and attitudes about immigration is weak and not statistically significant. After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.134 indicates that not being religiously affiliated and attitudes about immigration is somewhat strong but not statistically significant.

(see Table 15)

Females are most likely to register conservative attitudes about immigration when compared to males (b = 0.061). Although not statistically significant, a Beta value of 0.040 suggests that after controlling for the other variables, the sex of a respondent has a minimal impact on attitudes about immigration. (see Table 15)

Across racial/ethnic lines, regression results indicate that white respondents are most likely to register opposition to the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society (b = -0.195). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.109 suggests that the relative strength of the relationship between being white and attitudes about immigration is moderate. Black respondents on the other hand, are most likely to register conservative views about immigration (b = -0.057). The strength of the

relationship is low (Beta = 0.025). Alternatively, respondents of Hispanic origin are most likely to register liberal attitudes about immigration (b = -0.182). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.050 indicates that being of Hispanic origin has a minimal impact on attitudes about immigration. While interesting, none of the measures of race/ethnicity are significantly related to attitudes about immigration.

As years of education completed increased, respondents were more likely to register liberal attitudes about immigration (b = -0.044). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.164 indicates that years of education has the strongest impact on attitudes about immigration. Income level, on the other hand, has little impact on attitudes about immigration (Beta = 0.047).

Respondents who reside in the West South Central region of the U.S. are most likely to exhibit conservative views about immigration (b = 0.052). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.021 suggests that the relative strength of the relationship between region of the U.S. and attitudes about immigration is weak and not statistically significant. In addition, respondents who reside in rural areas of the country are most likely to register conservative attitudes about immigration (b = 0.011). The relative strength of the relationship is weak and not statistically significant (Beta = 0.007). (see Table 15)

OLS ***Regression Model of Independent Variables on American Attitudes about Family Values***

While the bivariate analysis provided interesting statistical results for American attitudes about whether people benefit from traditional family composition, the OLS regression model provided more precise, statistical findings for the impact of the

independentldemographic variables on American attitudes about family values because all independent variables are controlled simultaneously. In this OLS regression model, I arranged the independent variables, which included the variables identifying each specific religiosity dimension and the demographic variables, from variables of perceived, greater impact to the variables of perceived, lesser impact. Recall that the regression results reflect American attitudes during the year of 1996 rather than 2004. Recall as well that no variable identifying the experiential dimension of religiosity was included in the OLS regression model on attitudes about family values. Regression results indicate that 6.6% of the variance in attitudes about family values is explained by the selected independent/demographic variables. OLS regression model results on attitudes about family values are recorded in Table 16. Specific regression findings for the various independentldernographic variables are detailed in the following sections. (see Table 16)

Intellectual Religiosity

Although not statistically significant, respondents who believe that the Bible is the Word of God are most likely to exhibit liberal attitudes about family values (b = -0.103). After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the relationship between intellectual religiosity and attitudes about family values is weak (Beta = 0.037). (see Table 16)

Ritualistic Religiosity

Although not statistically significant, respondents who never go to Church are most likely to exhibit liberal attitudes about family values (b = -0.214). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.060 indicates that the relative strength of the

relationship between respondents who never go to Church and attitudes about family values is weak. Alternatively, respondents who go more than once a week to Church are significantly, most likely to believe that. people benefit from a traditional family composition (b = 0.671). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.145 indicates that respondents who go to Church more than once a week has the third strongest impact on attitudes about family values. The relationship is statistically significant. (see Table 16)

Regression results indicate that regardless of frequency of prayer, respondents were more likely to register conservative attitudes about family values. Although the relationship is not statistically significant, respondents who never engage in prayer are most likely to hold conservative attitudes about family values (b = 0.187). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.020 indicates that the relative strength of this relationship is weak. Similarly, respondents who engage in prayer several times a day are most likely exhibit conservative attitudes about family values. The relative strength of the relationship is weak and not statistically significant (Beta = 0.015). (see Table 16)

Ideological Religiosity

Respondents who do not believe in life after death are most likely to believe that people do benefit from a traditional family composition (b = 0.083). After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the relationship between ideological religiosity and attitudes about family values is weak (Beta = 0.025). (see Table 16)

Table 16:
OLS Regression Model of Independent Variables on American Attitudes about Family Values

	Slope	S.E.	Beta	t
RELIGIOSITY				
Intellectual Religiosity				
Word of God	-0.103	0.037	0.151	-0.682
Ritualistic (Ritual) Religiosity				
Never go to Church	-0.214	0.060	0.202	-1.062
Go more than once a week to Church	0.671	0.145	0.245	2.743**
Ritualistic (Devotion) Religiosity				
Never pray	0.187	0.020	0.475	0.393
Pray several times a day	0.043	0.015	0.152	0.285
Ideological Religiosity				
Don't believe in life after death	0.083	0.025	0.162	0.510
Consequential Religiosity				
Strong affiliation	-0.097	0.036	0.142	-0.681
Experiential Religiosity				
No variable available				
RELIGION				
Protestant	0.415	0.158	0.332	1.253
Catholic	0.187	0.063	0.339	0.553
Jew	0.352	0.034	0.587	0.600
None	0.255	0.061	0.388	0.656
SEX				
Female	-0.124	0.048	0.125	-0.992
RACE & ETHNICITY				
White	0.089	0.029	0.256	0.346
Black	0.087	0.022	0.309	0.281
Hispanic	0.155	0.028	0.361	0.429
YEARS OF EDUCATION				
Education	-0.071	0.162	0.024	-3.003**
FAMILY LNCOME				
Income of Previous Year (in dollars)	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.095
REGION OF THE U.S.				
West South Central	0.335	0.063	0.257	1.304
RURAL				
Rural	-0.092	0.035	0.129	-0.716

F= 1.606; p= 0.051
R-Square=0.066

Consequential Religiosity

Respondents who hold a strong religious affiliation are most likely to disagree with the idea that people benefit from a traditional family composition (b = -0.097). After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the relationship between

respondents who hold a strong religious affiliation and attitudes about family values is weak (Beta = 0.036). (see Table 16)

Demographic Variables

Across religious affiliation, being Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish was associated with conservative views about family values. That is, regardless of religious affiliation, respondents were likely to agree with the idea that people benefit from a traditional family composition. After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the relationship between being Protestant and attitudes about family values is strong (Beta = 0.158). After controlling for the other variables, being Catholic and attitudes about family values shares a weak relationship (Beta = 0.063). After controlling for the other variables, being Jewish and attitudes about family values is weak (Beta = 0.034). Interestingly, respondents who are not religiously affiliated are most likely to also believe that people benefit from a traditional family composition (b = 0.255). After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the relationship between respondents who are not religiously affiliated and attitudes about family values is weak (Beta = 0.061). (see Table 16)

Females were most likely than males to exhibit liberal attitudes about family values (b = -0.124). The relative strength of the relationship between sex of respondent and attitudes about family values is weak (Beta = 0.048). (see Table 16)

Across racial/ethnic lines, white, black, and Hispanic respondents are most likely to express conservative views about family values. That is, regardless of race/ethnicity, at least among whites, blacks, and Hispanics, respondents are most likely to believe that people benefit from a traditional family composition (b = 0.089; b = 0.087; b = 0.155,

respectively). After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the relationship between being white and attitudes about family values is weak (Beta = 0.029). After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the relationship between being black and attitudes about family values is weak (Beta = 0.022). After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the relationship between being Hispanic and attitudes about family values is weak (Beta = 0.028). (see Table 16)

Regression results indicate that the more years of education completed, the more likely respondents will disagree with the idea that people benefit from a traditional family composition (b = -0.071). After controlling for the other variables, a Beta value of 0.162 indicates that years of education has the strongest impact on attitudes about family values. Income level on the other hand, shares a weak association with attitudes about family values (Beta = 0.005). (see Table 16)

Respondents who reside in the West South Central region of the U.S. are most likely to conservative attitudes about family values (b = 0.335). After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the relationship was weak (Beta = 0.063). Furthermore, respondents who reside in rural areas of the U.S. are most likely to disagree with the idea that people benefit from a traditional family composition (b = -0.092). After controlling for the other variables, the relative strength of the association is weak (Beta = 0.035). (see Table 16)

Chapter 8: Discussion

Findings were quite interesting and revealing. Some of the statistical results were expected while- others were completely unexpected. The relationship between the religiosity dimensions and attitudes about homosexuality, abortion, immigration, and family values varied depending on the specific dimensions. Specifically, attitudes about homosexuality shares the strongest association with consequential religiosity, followed by experiential, intellectual, ritualistic (ritual), ideological, and ritualistic (devotion) religiosity. Although some were not statistically significant, regardless of the religiosity dimension, respondents who were religious at the strongest category of each religiosity dimension were most likely to hold conservative attitudes about homosexuality, abortion, and immigration, while also holding conservative attitudes about family values.

Attitudes about homosexuality and abortion shares the strongest association with respondents who held a strong religious affiliation These results were quite expected as individuals who hold a strong affiliation to a religious institution will tend to uphold to strict and conservative moral values and beliefs. In fact, regression results suggests that respondents with a strong affiliation will most likely express strong homophobic and anti pro-choice attitudes. Moreover, attitudes about abortion are held an event strongest association with respondents who engaged in daily, frequent prayer. This finding is quite interesting because it implies that the more respondents pray, the more likely they are to develop conservative views – which may be related to a stronger, more intimate, and closer relationship with their religious values and beliefs. That is, regardless of religious affiliation, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish backgrounds, if engaging in more prayer, are likely to believe that homosexuality is wrong, that abortion is wrong under any

circumstances, that immigration has a negative impact on this country, and that people benefit from a traditional family composition.

Findings that were unexpected included the fact that none of the religiosity dimensions had little or no impact on attitudes about immigration and family values. That is, the set of independent and demographic variables chosen for analysis, explained little in the variance of attitudes about immigration and family values. What this finding implies is that it is not the respondents' religiosity that pushes respondents to believe one way or another, regarding immigration and family values, but rather other forces have a greater impact. For example, negative American attitudes about immigration in the year of 1994 may have been triggered by a single or series of incidents in which a foreign immigrant committed a significantly, negative crime. Alternatively, during 1994, the U.S. may have faced economic burdens which the media or the government may have blamed immigrants for the cause. Nevertheless, there are number of reasons why immigration attitudes and family values attitudes were little explained by the various religiosity dimensions and demographic variables included in the OLS regression models.

Another finding that was unexpected was the fact that respondents that were *not* religiously affiliated held the strongest, conservative views regarding homosexuality, followed by Protestants and Catholics. Interestingly, Protestants held conservative views regarding each of the other social issues addressed in this honors thesis: abortion, immigration attitudes, and family values. Protestants may hold such conservative views as a result of a greater, doctrinal centrality in teachings, values, and beliefs. As expected, Jewish respondents exhibited the most tolerant views about homosexuality. Indeed, the literature does support this finding by suggesting that the American Jewish community

tend to hold liberal views. What may account for this social liberalism may be the lack thereof a strict, conservative doctrine that condemns or prohibits homosexuality and abortion as well as a lack of value in immigration and a traditional family composition.

I was not surprised to find that sex of respondent had a significant but weak impact on American social attitudes. Clearly, the development of social attitudes simply goes beyond biological differences, as far as sex is concerned: religiosity levels, years of education, and income level explained an overall larger variance in attitudes about homosexuality, abortion, immigration, and family values. Findings suggest however, that females are most likely than men to hold liberal views about homosexuality, stronger pro-choice attitudes, conservative attitudes about immigration, and disagree with the idea that people benefit from a traditional family composition.

Although regression results for race/ethnicity and social attitudes were not statistically significant, black respondents held the strongest, conservative views regarding homosexuality, followed by white respondents and Hispanic respondents. Black respondents also held the strongest, conservative attitudes regarding immigration and family values. That is, black respondents are more likely than any other American race/ethnic group to express negative attitudes toward immigrants and most likely to believe that respondents do in fact, benefit from a traditional family composition. Moreover, black respondents are more likely than white and Hispanic respondents to hold strong, pro-choice attitudes. These findings are not at all surprising, as the literature suggests that black respondents are more likely to experience a mystical, religious experience and to hold homophobic views.

Across social attitudes, years of education shared a strong association with attitudes about homosexuality, abortion, immigration, and family values. The more educated respondents were, the more likely they were to develop liberal views regarding homosexuality, pro-choice attitudes, non-traditional attitudes regarding family values, and interestingly disagree with the idea that immigrants have a negative impact on American society. What this finding suggests, regarding attitudes about immigration, is that the educated segments of society may realize that our society benefits from immigrants. Furthermore, educated respondents may also realize that integrating and advocating for the immigration, yields both cultural exchange and economic development.

As expected, residents of the West South Central region of the U.S. (which includes Texas) were more likely than residents of other regions to hold homophobic views, strong anti pro-abortion attitudes, conservative attitudes about immigration, and conservative attitudes about family values. This is interesting because it supports my hypothesis that our region is much more conservative than other areas of the country, such as the State of New York. Although the variable constructed to identify either rural/urban areas of the country shared a very weak association with attitudes about homosexuality, abortion, immigration, and family values, results do indicate that respondents residing in rural areas are likely to express homophobic views, anti pro-choice attitudes, negative attitudes about immigration, and disagree with the idea that people do benefit from a traditional family composition. The last of findings is quite interesting, because I would have guessed that people living in rural areas, would value a

traditional family composition more than individuals residing in urban, more populated areas.

Employing a multidimensional appraach to the operationalization of religiosity was valuable. Doing so, helps conceptualize the many ways a respondent may exhibit his or her religiousness. Findings suggest however, that despite the dimension of religiosity, individuals who expressed the strongest levels of religiosity were more inclined to exhibit conservative social attitudes. Using a religiosity index that assumes respondents to be more religious than others based on a unidimensional scale may cause respondents to score low if they are only religious at one dimension of religiosity.

I have learned that every person in America and the world for that matter is unique in their own, personal ways. My approach to operationalize religiosity through Glock's (1959, 1962) dimensions attempts to integrate this very personal ideology.

Chapter 9: Implications for Future Research

The greatest limitation encountered in the completion of this undergraduate, honors thesis project was the use of data collected by others. The investigators could not have had my conceptualization in mind with regard to the dimensions of religiosity. Although the General Social Survey data is available for a number of decades, a limited number of variables were available that I felt, represented modem attitudes regarding American values and beliefs about immigration and family values. Perhaps future researchers will have the opportunity and funds to collect original data focused specifically on capturing the dimensions of religiosity and which can include the same measures within the same time frame.

APPENDIX A

Table 2: Item to Index Correlation for Immigration Index

Pairwise deletion (1-tailed test)
Significance levels: ** = .01, * = .05

	X1:	X2:	X3:	X4:
X1: IMMINDEX10	-	-	-	-
X2: IMMECON2	0.474**	-	-	-
X3: IMMPUSH2	0.584**	-0.159**	-	-
X4: IMMUNITE2	0.661**	-0.201**	0.284**	-

N: 1281
Cronbach's alpha: 0.75

Table 3: Item to Index Correlation for Family Values Index

Pairwise deletion (1-tailed test)
Significance levels: ** = .01, * = .05

	X1:	X2:	X3:	X4:	X5:
X1: FAMINDEX11	-	-	-	-	-
X2: CHLDBEN2	0.590**	-	-	-	-
X3: ALLBEN2	0.700**	0.076**	-	-	-
X4: NOONEHRT2	0.571**	-0.021**	0.423**	-	-
X5: WOMENBEN2	0.808**	0.565**	0.433**	0.154**	-

N: 1281
Cronbach's alpha: 0.90

Table 17: Item to Index Correlation for Abortion Index

Pairwise deletion (1-tailed test)
Significance levels: ** = .01, * = .05

	X1:	X2:	X3:	X4:	X5:	X6:	X7:	X8:
X1: ABORTION	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
X2: ABDEFECT	0.760**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
X3: ABNOMORE	0.853**	0.501**	-	-	-	-	-	-
X4: ABHLTH	0.610**	0.568**	0.333**	-	-	-	-	-
X5: ABPOOR	0.849**	0.497**	0.796**	0.337**	-	-	-	-
X6: ABRAPE	0.728**	0.634**	0.464**	0.541**	0.458**	-	-	-
X7: ABSINGLE	0.854**	0.492**	0.837**	0.325**	0.826**	0.459**	-	-
X8: ABANY	0.798**	0.470**	0.795**	0.329**	0.760**	0.474**	0.844**	-

N: 1281
Cronbach's alpha: 0.94

APPENDIX B

VARIABLE SELECTION - GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS

		Year of Survey																														
Variable Name	Question #	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	80	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	93	94A	94B	96A	96B	98A	98B	00A	00B	02A	02B	04A	04B
RELIGIOSITY																																
BIBLE	120A											X	X		X	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	1	4		x	x
ATTEND	105	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
PRAY	110										X	X	X		X	4	1	1		1	1	1	1		1		4		4		4	
GODCHNG	1258																			4					4						4	
RELITEN	328/0			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
REBORN	370															4			4						4						4	
NATURGOD																					X											
GOD																					X											
POSTLIFE																							X									
IMM INDEX																																
IMMPUSH	531A																				4											
IMMECON	529A																				4											
IMMUNITE	529C																				4											
FAM. VALUES INDEX																																
CHLDBEN	563C																						4									
ALLBEN	563D																						4									
NOONEHRT	564E																						4									
WOMENBEN	563B																						4									
HOMOSEX	219		X	X		X	X		X	X		X	X		X	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	
ABANY	206G						X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	
CONTROL VARIABLES																																
RELIG	104	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
RACE	24	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4			
ETHNIC	1173A	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
RACETH4	Constructed from RACE and ETHNIC.																															
YEAR		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
AGE	13	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
SEX	23	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
EDUC	15	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
REALINC	1326	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4	4	4	4	4					4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
REGION	51	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
RURAL	Constructed from SRCBELT																														x	

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